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ABSTRACT
Three experiments investigated the effect of various 
kinds of reflection (within-task and post-task reflection) 
on learning a process control task. Also, two ways of 
providing learners with alternative ideas about task 
behavior, exposure to other's ideas and providing hints for 
task solution, were examined. The task involved a 
simulated "sugar production factory" in which the learners 
sought to control sugar production by manipulating 
workforce size. It was predicted that combining within- 
task reflection with exposure to alternative task ideas 
would lead to superior task performance through integration 
of experiential and reflective knowledge. Contrary to the 
prediction, within-task reflection consistently interfered 
with learning and knowledge integration by causing learners 
to acquire overly general and invalid rules (reflective 
knowledge) about the relations among task variables. These 
results were interpreted as evidence of a fundamental 
tendency (reflective abstraction error) of people to seek 
simple relations among variables in complex systems when 
engaged in within-task reflection. The most efficient 
learning occurred when reflection was discouraged during 
task performance, learners were given access to alternative 
ideas about task behavior, and they were given an 
opportunity to discuss their task experiences with other 
learners post-task.
v i
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INTRODUCTION
A long-standing view of many investigators of learning 
is that people acquire and apply knowledge and skills in 
two distinct and possibly complementary ways (e.g., 
Anderson, 1982, 1983; Berry & Dienes, 1993, Broadbent, 
Fitzgerald, & Broadbent, 1986; Brooks, 1978; Cho & Mathews, 
1996; Elio & Anderson, 1984; Kolers & Roediger, 1984; 
Lazarus, 1991; Lewicki, 1986; Mathews, Buss, Stanley, 
Blanchard-Fields, Cho, & Druhan, 1989; Reber, 1993) . One 
kind of knowledge is direct, not mediated by reflective 
thought processes such as planning or reasoning. Instead, 
decisions and actions based on this knowledge are made 
intuitively, without reflection, and are determined to a 
great degree by environmental stimuli (Brooks, 1978;
Lewicki, 1986; Norman, 1993; Reber, 1989, 1993).
The term used to refer to this kind of knowledge varies 
depending upon the theoretical position of the researcher. 
Among the various terms used are procedural (e.g.,
Anderson, 1976, 1983), nonanalytic (Brooks, 1978) , 
instance-based (Logan, 1988), memory-based (e.g., Mathews 
et al., 1989), implicit (e.g., Reber 1989, 1993), 
unselective (Hayes & Broadbent, 1988), and experiential 
(Norman, 1993) . The key attribute of knowledge that is 
shared by all of these conceptions is that of minimal 
conscious mediation. That is, knowledge of this type 
relies heavily on environmental cues to activate the
1
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relevant knowledge; it is highly stimulus-bound. Thus, 
performance based on this kind of knowledge can be 
relatively fast and effortless because little reflection is 
required.
Norman's term, experiential knowledge, will be used 
herein because it makes the fewest claims about mechauiisms 
underlying knowledge use. A good example of experiential 
knowledge can be seen in the skill of a chess master 
scanning the chess board for possible moves. The pattern 
of chess pieces, as perceived by the player, immediately 
suggests or affords possible moves. Thus, experiential 
knowledge influences behavior largely through its effect on 
perception (e.g.. Chase & Simon, 1973; Gibson, 1979; 
Perruchet & Gallego, 1997).
Experiential knowledge is not taught but is acquired 
through direct experience (e.g., Gibson, 1979).
Furthermore, it is suited best for action, not 
communication. It may be difficult to express one's 
experiential knowledge. For example, knowledge engineers 
involved in constructing expert systems have long struggled 
with the problem of extracting from experts everything they 
know about their particular area of expertise (Hoffman,
1987).
Contrast this experiential Icnowledge with reflective 
knowledge. Reflective knowledge is suited ideally for 
thinking and communicating rather than action. When one
2
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performs a task using reflective knowledge (e.g., following 
a recipe), the performance is mediated by reflection, as 
opposed to the use of experiential knowledge which is 
immediate (Anderson, 1982, 1983; Norman, 1993).
By definition, reflective knowledge is accessible to 
consciousness. In fact, in the scientific community it is 
the primary meauis of communication. The theory is the 
quintessential example of reflective knowledge. Reflective 
Icnowledge is suited ideally for an existence in the public 
space where ideas are developed and refined.
The very quality which gives reflective knowledge its 
power, its abstractness, can also be its weakness. 
Reflective knowledge may be misapplied because the 
conditions of its use may have been abstracted away. It is 
incomplete because it is abstract and therefore missing 
many possibly important details (Ornstein & Ehrlich, 1989). 
Even though the abstract quality of reflective knowledge 
should enable transfer across domains, it's very 
abstractness may actually prevent it from being accessed in 
relevant situations. The literature on analogical transfer 
demonstrates the difficulty of transferring reflective 
knowledge (e.g., Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Gick &
Holyoak, 1980). Typically, one must be told of the 
relevance of one's knowledge for the transfer problem. 
Otherwise, no transfer occurs.
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The kind of thinking required of reflective knowledge 
may demand too much of people's limited capacity memory and 
attention (Hayes & Broadbent, 1988; Miller, 1956). The 
modem development of cognitive artifacts ranging from 
paper and pencil to computer applications used for decision 
support is testimony to the difficulty of reflective 
thinking as well as its importance.
The complementary nature of experiential and reflective 
knowledge suggests that integrating the two would be 
beneficial for learning and transfer. For example, the 
context-bound character of experiential knowledge could 
help ground reflective knowledge and prevent its 
misapplication or over-generalization. Conversely, 
reflective knowledge could facilitate the transfer of 
experiential knowledge into novel but related situations. 
These positive outcomes of combining experiential and 
reflective knowledge have not been born out by studies, 
however. As a subsequent literature review will show, 
successful integration of the two kinds of knowledge is not 
easily achieved. Learners tend to default to experiential 
modes of thinking when reflective strategies fall into 
difficulty (Berry & Dienes, 1993; Reber, 1993). Also, when 
learning to perform complex tasks, learners may acquire 
invalid reflective knowledge in the form of mental models 
or verbalizable rules that lead to less than optimal 
performance (Reber, 1976; Reber, Kassin, Lewis, & Cantor,
4
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1980). Finally, dissociations between experiential and 
reflective knowledge may occur, particularly in situations 
where the rules governing task behavior are not salient 
(Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
Understanding how and when integration fails or 
succeeds can lead to improvements in methods of training 
and educating amd increase our basic understanding of 
learning and transfer. The intent of this study was to 
investigate how learning and transfer is affected by 
encouraging various kinds of within-task and post-task 
reflection and by giving learners access to alternative 
ideas about how to perform a task.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This literature review focuses on the effects of 
explicit or reflective processes on the resulting 
knowledge, performance, and transfer for tasks in which 
dissociations (i.e., lack of integration) frequently have 
been reported. The studies to be discussed used three 
methods for eliciting reflective thinking: (1) instructing
participants to discover the rules or structure that 
determines the behavior of the task variables; (2) 
providing explicit instruction or information about the 
rules that relate task variables; and (3) requiring 
participants to verbalize as they perform the task. 
Following the discussion of the literature, the 
implications of these findings for the integration of 
knowledge will be discussed. Finally, the results of three 
experiments will be presented.
Effects of Rule Search Instructions 
One way to investigate the influence of reflective 
thought on experiential learning is to instruct 
participants to attempt to figure out the rules governing 
the behavior of the task. The results of this approach 
have been mixed. The effect of rule search instructions 
has ranged from decreasing the level of learning (e.g.. 
Berry & Broadbent, 1988; Howard & Balias, 1980; Reber,
1976; Reber et al., 1980) to having no effect (Dienes, 
Broadbent, & Berry, 1991; Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey, 1984),
6
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or improving learning (Berry & Broadbent/ 1988; Reber et 
al./ 1980). The particular effect those rule-search 
instructions produce seems to be related to the salience of 
the rules governing the task (Berry & Broadbent, 1988; 
Mathews et al., 1989; Reber et al., 1980).
Reber et al. (1980) investigated the effect of salience 
on people's ability to learn an artificial grammar. Reber 
and his colleagues presented half of their participants 
with training stimuli arranged randomly in an array to make 
less salient the common features (i.e., patterns of letters 
in grammatical exemplars) that could be used to facilitate 
rule learning. Stimuli for the remaining participants were 
ordered in a way that maximized the salience of common 
features. Learning was measured by requiring participants 
to classify new stimuli as valid or invalid according to 
the rules. These authors reported that rule search 
instructions reduced learning in the random presentation 
condition only. A more fine-grained analysis of the data 
showed that participants in the random presentation 
conditions tended repeatedly to misclassify stimuli that 
were presented more than once during test. This suggested 
that the participants had acquired invalid rules which they 
were using to incorrectly classify certain stimuli. Thus, 
the likelihood of acquiring invalid knowledge can be 
increased if stimulus structure is difficult to detect and 
explicit processing, such as rule-search, is invoked.
7
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When the rules governing relations among the stimuli 
are salient or easy to discover, rule-search instructions 
can have a positive effect on learning (Mathews et al., 
1989; Lee, 1995; Reber et al., 1980). Mathews et al.
(1989) used a biconditional artificial grammar built from a 
set of correspondence rules described below. This grammar 
generated letter-strings consisting of eight consonants, 
with a dot separating the first and last four letters 
(e.g., "SCCT.VPPX"). There were no constraints on the four 
letters to the left of the dot, except that they had to be 
from the set of letters reserved for the grammar. The 
correspondence rules specified which letters must occur in 
corresponding positions in the left and right halves of the 
string. For example, S goes with V, C with P, and so on. 
Thus, in the example above, an S in the first position 
requires a V in the corresponding position in the right 
half of the string.
One likely effect of the correspondence rules was that 
salient patterns such as repeated letters, "SCCC.VPPP" for 
example, focused the learner on the relationships across 
the left and right halves of the strings. This made it 
more likely that learners would discover the rules. Two 
training tasks were used to elicit either an explicit rule- 
discovery strategy or an implicit exemplar memorization 
strategy. Learning by participants in the rule-discovery 
condition was superior to that of participants in the
8
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exemplar memorization conditions. This finding is 
consistent with the claim of Reber et al. (1980) that rule- 
search would be successful only when the rules are easy to 
discover.
Rule-search instructions do not always affect 
performance in implicit learning tasks (Dulauiy et al.,
1984; Lee, 1995; Mathews et al., 1989). In learning tasks 
involving rules that are extremely difficult to find, 
participants are likely to fall back on an implicit or 
experiential mode to guide their performance (e.g.. Berry & 
Dienes, 1993; Reber, 1993). The deliberate engagement in 
reflective or explicit thinking is effortful and less fun 
than experientially performing the task (Ericsson, Krampe,
& Tesch-Romer, 1993) or being in flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1990) . Learners know that progress can often be made by 
mere repetition of the task, without reflective thinking. 
Thus, there is a strong natural tendency to perform a task 
without attempting effortful reflective strategies.
Effects of Providing Explicit Instruction
A few studies have provided specific information to 
participants about the nature of the rules underlying the 
task (Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Reber et al., 1980; Stanley, 
Mathews, Buss, & Kotler-Cope, 1989). Berry & Broadbent 
(1984) used the sugar production task in which participants 
attempted to reach a specified target sugar production 
level in a computer simulated sugar refinery by
9
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manipulating the size of the workforce employed at the 
refinery. Sugar production and workforce size were related 
by a simple mathematical equation. On each of a series of 
trials, the con^uter displayed the current sugar 
production. The participants were required to input the 
size of a work force they thought necessary to reach the 
target production level. Then they received immediate 
feedback about the actual production level achieved.
One aim of Berry cind Broadbent's (1984) study was to 
find out if verbal instruction on how to reach the target 
would affect task performance and verbalizable knowledge 
similarly. They found that verbal instruction improved 
their participants' ability to answer questions about task 
behavior but it had no effect on their ability to control 
sugar production, except when combined with a requirement 
to verbally justify each response.
Stanley et al., (1989), also used the sugar production 
task to investigate the effect of several kinds of 
instruction such as exemplar memorization, providing a 
simple heuristic, rule instruction, and providing written 
transcripts gathered from subjects "thinking aloud" as they 
performed the task. Stanley et al., (1989) found a small 
but statistically significant benefit from all of these 
instruction types relative to a control condition. 
Interestingly, performance in rule instruction conditions 
was no better than in exemplar memorization conditions even
10
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though it provided the participants with reflective 
knowledge sübout relations among task variables. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis of separate kinds of 
knowledge. Verbal instruction primarily influences 
reflective knowledge whereas task performance is based 
primarily on knowledge gained through task experience 
(experiential knowledge). Sometimes, even perfect 
reflective knowledge of task behavior can be useless 
without real task experience (Reber & Millward, 1968).
Effects of Verbalization 
Another way to encourage participants to think and 
reflect as they leam is to require them to think out loud 
and report their reasoning as they perform the task. It 
has been suggested that the requirement to verbalize while 
learning a task might improve learning by maintaining the 
learner's focus on the relevant variables, assuming the 
relevant variables are salient or likely to be selected by 
the learner (Berry & Broadbent, 1984). Berry and Broadbent 
(1984) reported that concurrent verbalization was not 
effective in improving learning in a complex control task 
(e.g., sugar production task). However, their experiments 
lacked a proper nonverbalizing control. Subsequent 
investigations, using similar tasks, showed verbalization 
to cause a small but positive increase in the level of 
learning (McGeorge & Burton, 1989; Stanley et al., 1989).
11
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It is difficult to interpret the results of these 
studies because the methods of eliciting verbalization 
differed widely across studies. Berry and Broadbent’s 
(1984) participants were asked to give a reason for each 
response as they interacted with the task. McGeorge and 
Burton (1989) asked their participants to describe any 
rules or heuristics they were using. In both of these 
studies participants verbalized concurrently with task 
performance. By contrast, the participants in the 
experiments of Stanley et al. (1989) verbalized 
instructions for an unseen partner to perform the task 
after each ten interactions with the task.
That these different methods all led to improved 
performance (except Berry & Broadbent) suggests that any 
kind of verbalization is sufficient for improvement in 
performance. However, some findings from problem solving 
research suggest that some forms of verbalization are 
better than others (Berardi-Colleta, Buyer, Dominowski, & 
Rellinger, 1995). Berardi-Coletta et al. (1995) 
hypothesized that problem solving would be enhanced only 
when participants engaged in "metacognitive processing." 
They described metacognitive processing as a reflective 
process of attending to what one is doing to solve the 
problem (process-focused) rather than focusing on aspects 
of the problem (problem-focused) . Berardi-Colleta et al.
(1995) elicited process-focused behavior by periodically
12
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prompting their participants to justify and evaluate their 
actions. Problem-focused behavior was elicited by having 
participants periodically report on various aspects of the 
problem (e.g., the goal or the current problem state) . In 
support of their hypothesis, Berardi-Colleta et al. (1995) 
found that problem solving performance was superior for 
participants in process-focused conditions, relative to 
problem-focused conditions. Berardi-Colleta et al. (1995) 
also reported that process-focused participants were more 
likely to change their strategies and problem 
representations when these were found to be inadequate for 
problem solution. By contrast, problem-focused 
participants persisted in inefficient strategies and 
problem representations.
Other investigations have found problem solving 
performance to be positively related to engagement in self­
dialogue or generating explanations about task behavior 
(Biemiller & Meichenbaum, 1992; Chi, Bassock, Lewis, 
Reimann, & Glaser, 1987; Chi, DeLeeuw, Chiu, & LaVarcher, 
1994) . For example, Chi et al. (1987) collected think- 
aloud protocols of students studying example problems.
They found that better problem solvers generated more 
statements indicative of self-monitoring and self­
explanation, absolutely and proportionally, than poor 
problem solvers. Also, the number of self-monitoring and 
self-explanation statements correlated highly with problem
13
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solving performance. More recently, Chi et al. (1994) 
reported that participants prompted for self-explanations 
showed greater understanding of studied materials than 
participants not so prompted.
Siimmarv and Implications of F.Tnr»i rical Findings 
There are several key findings that bear on the problem 
of integrating experiential and reflective knowledge.
First, reliance on experiential modes of thinking and 
experiential knowledge is a default strategy when 
reflective strategies run into difficulty (Reber, 1993). 
Second, when the task is structured so that the rules and 
relevant variables are not salient and quality feedback is 
missing, learners often end up with invalid reflective 
knowledge or mental models (Hayes & Broadbent, 1988; Reber 
et al., 1980). Further, these invalid models are often 
resistant to challenge or change (Berardi-Colleta et al., 
1995; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986). Third, 
providing reflective knowledge, in the form of instruction, 
tends to affect the learner's mental model and leave 
experiential knowledge unaffected (Berry & Broadbent,
1984). Last, thinking êibout one's knowledge (i.e., 
process-focused) in relation to evidence (experiential 
knowledge) rather than thinking with it (e.g., problem- 
focused) is most likely lead to revision of one's model 
(Berardi-Colleta et al., 1995; Kuhn, 1989).
14
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These findings suggest three conditions necessary for 
integration of reflective and experiential knowledge: (1) 
Provide support for reflective thinking so learners will 
not default to experiential mode, (2) provide exposure to 
alternative task conceptions (mental models) along with 
accurate and timely feedback for evaluating models, and (3) 
provide an environment for learners to think ahmit- their 
models in relation to the task as they practice.
Support for Reflective Thinking
Relying on experiential knowledge requires fewer 
resources than reflecting on and reasoning from a mental 
model of the task. Performing a task in experiential mode 
requires only attending to the task; the task itself 
provides the retrieval cues for past solutions. In 
contrast, performing in reflective mode requires 
maintaining in conscious memory a model of the task (see 
Norman, 1993 for a persuasive argument about the extra 
effort required for reflection). Thus, some kind of 
support for reflection might lessen the tendency to fall 
back on experiential strategies for learning. However, 
merely instructing participants to learn reflectively will 
likely fail. Therefore, the reflection must be "built in" 
to the learning task.
Exposure to Alternative Models
When learners do seek rules governing task behavior or 
otherwise build a mental model of the task, and there is a
15
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lack of timely and accurate feedback, the resulting rules 
or model can be flawed. Task experience is not sufficient 
to cause revision of the learner's model for a number of 
reasons. In some cases there may be insufficient or 
unreliable data for modifying the model (Brehmer, 1980) .
At times, repeated task experience may entrench one's model 
and block solution of problems easily solved otherwise 
(e.g., Luchins, 1942). At other times, one's model may 
resist repeated opportunities for change by creating 
"exception rules" (Holland et al., 1986) . Thus, an 
increasing level of experience is not necessarily 
associated with an increasing correctness of one's model.
Regardless of the quality of the data confronting their 
mental models, people most often are biased toward evidence 
that confirms their model (e.g., Wason, 1968) . Therefore, 
the learner is unlikely to revise a faulty model or to 
consider alternatives (cf., Kareev & Avrahami, 1995).
Learners also may lack reflective skills. Rather than 
reflecting about their models and the relevant evidence, 
individuals lacking reflective skills might reflect with 
their models (Kuhn, 1989). Thus, the model is never a 
candidate for modification as it is largely invisible to 
the thinker.
Overcoming these obstacles to successful model revision 
is necessary for integrating reflective and experiential 
knowledge. To achieve this the learner must be encouraged
16
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to consider alternative models and must have available 
accurate and timely feedback about the quality of each 
model.
Thinking About Instead of Thinking With
There is no guarantee however that providing 
alternative models along with accurate feedback will have 
the desired result. It is possible that providing this 
extra support to learners will affect reflective knowledge 
only, leaving experiential knowledge, and therefore task 
performance, untouched. This might be prevented by 
providing a means for learners to use their reflective 
knowledge, and reflect on that knowledge, as they practice 
the task (acquire experiential knowledge) .
A recent investigation of Mathews et al. (1996), using 
the sugar production task, tested a procedure devised to 
meet the three conditions just discussed. The procedures 
used by Mathews et al. (1996) included group discussions 
among learners to formulate explicit models of task 
performance. The participants were required to express 
their explicit models in the form of a written policy for 
performing the task. The group discussions were expected 
to provide participants with an opportunity for reflection 
about their models and to make available alternative models 
(from other group members) . Additionally, Mathews et al.
(1996) gave feedback to learners about the quality of their
17
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explicit models thereby raising the quality of evidence 
available to learners for evaluating their models.
Mathews et al. (1996) also incorporated a reflective 
practice procedure designed to facilitate integration of 
the learners’ mental models with their experiential 
knowledge. This was predicted to reduce the dissociation 
between reflective and experiential knowledge. These 
procedures produced substantial inqjrovement in performance 
when the participants received all of these treatments.
The current investigation attempted to replicate and extend 
the work of Mathews et al- (1996) . Therefore, the findings 
of Mathews et al. (1996) will be discussed in some detail 
below.
Summary of Mathews et al. (1996)
The task used by Mathews et al. (1996) is a dynamic 
systems control task in which participants learn to control 
sugar output in a computer simulated sugar production 
factory (Berry & Broadbent, 1984, 1988). Briefly, 
participants interact with a computer-based simulation of a 
sugar production factory. The task requires participants 
to control the level of sugar production by setting the 
level of work force. Sugar production is computed as a 
function of sugar production on the previous trial and work 
force on the current trial. The equation relating sugar 
production to work force is = (20X W) - Pq + N. P̂  is the
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sugar production output ranging from 1000 to 12000. Pq is 
the sugar production level at the beginning of the trial 
and W is the number of workers entered by the participant. 
W  ranges from 100 to 1200. N is a random element that is 
added to the sugar production output. This value is 
randomly selected on each trial from the values 1000, 0, 
and -1000. The random element functions to make the 
relation between production and workforce less salient. 
Sugar production is not allowed to exceed 12000 tons nor go 
below 1000 tons. In those cases where a participant's 
response results in sugar production outside of this range, 
the production output is truncated to the appropriate 
maximum or minimum value. Each time the participant 
chooses and enters a value for work force, the computer 
calculates the new sugar production level and displays it 
on the computer screen.
Mathews et al. (1996) introduced a novel reflective 
practice procedure to force participants to think about the 
relation between their reflective knowledge (as represented 
in their written strategies or policies) and how they 
actually performed the task. During the interval between 
practice sessions, Mathews et al. evaluated each policy via 
computer simulation. The results of the simulations were 
then used to provide feedback to the participants about the 
quality and behavior of their policies. On each trial,
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participants were required to predict how many workers 
their written policy would use (as determined by the 
simulation), and what particular rule of their policy would 
be employed to set worker level on that trial. Then, they 
were given an opportunity to suggest a different worker 
level that might get them closer to the target level of 
output. Following their responses, they received feedback 
on what level of workers their policy would have prescribed 
in this situation (as determined by the conç)uter 
simulation), which rule or statement of their policy would 
have been used to set worker level, and the outcomes in 
sugar production levels for both their policy's response 
and their alternative response (if one was suggested) .
Two conditions were compared. In one condition 
(singles) participants worked alone. These participants 
formulated their own individual policy for controlling 
sugar production after each of the three practice sessions. 
The practice sessions were distributed over a one-week 
period with one session every other day. Participants in 
the groups condition worked together in teams of four or 
five individuals after each practice session to create a 
group policy. Both singles and groups used the reflective 
practice procedure in which they predicted what their 
previous policy would do during the second half-hour of the 
second and third practice sessions (they had no policy to 
reflect on in the first practice session).
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The policies generated by participants in the group's 
condition were superior (better at controlling sugar 
production as determined by computer simulation) to those 
in the singles condition. Similarly, mean individual 
performance for participants in the groups condition was 
better than that in the singles condition.
Mathews et al. (1996) used a predetermined cutoff score 
to quantify the number of expert performers and policies in 
each condition in the final session of practice. Fifty- 
nine percent of the participants in the groups condition 
were classified as expert performers compared to 13 percent 
in the singles condition. The difference was statistically 
reliable. All of the groups achieved expert level policies 
whereas none of the singles * policies achieved expert 
level.
Discussion of Results of Mathews et al. (1996)
Apparently, group interaction was essential for 
obtaining the best results in terms of the most expert 
level policies and for improving individual performance.
The group interaction presumably was effective because it 
helped overcome rigidity in individual approaches to the 
task (i.e., negative effects of mental sets, e.g., Norman, 
1993; Luchins, 1942) and it exposed learners to new and 
different ideas for performing the task. However, it must 
be noted that the group interaction variable was confounded
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with exposure to alternative models. That is, participants 
in the singles condition did not have access to any 
policies other than their own. It is possible that 
exposing participants in the singles condition to the ideas 
of other participants in the absence of group interaction 
(e.g., give each participant a written text of other 
policies) would have produced benefits as well.
The findings of Mathews et al. also suggest that 
reflective practice was essential for improvement in policy 
quality and task performance. Mathews et al. argued that 
reflective practice helped learners integrate new ideas 
(reflective knowledge) with experiential knowledge that 
drives task performance. As suggestive as their results 
are, there was no direct comparison of reflective practice 
to a control condition in which no reflective practice was 
done.
Therefore, one of the major goals of this investigation 
was to attempt to replicate the findings of Mathews et al. 
(1996) while adding an appropriate nonreflective control 
condition and removing the confound of the group 
interaction variable and exposure to alternative models. 
That goal was addressed in Experiment 1.
The results of Experiment 1 failed to replicate the 
findings of Mathews et al. (1996) . The results suggested 
that the lack of effectiveness of reflective practice might
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be related to the kinds of models learners use when 
reflecting- This was explored in Experiments 2 and 3.
As the general intent of this investigation was to 
examine how learning and transfer are affected by 
reflection and access to alternative ideas, the third 
experiment included a trsinsfer task at the end of training.
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EXPERIMENT 1 
Introduction
Experiment 1 attempted to replicate auid extend the 
findings of Mathews et al. (1996) in which a combination of 
reflective practice, exposing learners to alternative 
models, and group discussion led to superior performance 
relative to a condition in which learners were exposed only 
to their own ideas. In particular, it investigated the 
effect of reflection (i.e., writing down one's strategies 
and discussing ideas with group members), exposure to 
alternative models, and reflective practice on performance 
in the sugar production task.
Reflection
One kind of reflection occurs in the process of writing 
down one's ideas. Requiring participants to produce 
written statements of their task knowledge can be used as a 
way of assuring that reflection occurs. At the end of each 
session in this experiment, participants in all but two 
control conditions were required to write down a set of 
instructions, a "policy", for performing the task. Thus, 
each policy was taken as evidence for reflective behavior 
and was assumed to provide information about the nature of 
each participant's mental model of the task.
It was predicted that this reflection would be 
insufficient for improving task performance primarily 
because it occurred post-task; policies were written at the
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end of each practice session. Gagne and White (1978) 
suggested that successful instruction occurs only when 
prepositional (reflective) knowledge and intellectual 
skills (i.e., experiential knowledge) are linked together 
through reflection concurrent with practice.
Exposure to Alternative Models
Exposure to alternative models may be necessary to 
counteract people's tendency to seek only information that 
is consistent with their view (Wason, 1968). To provide 
the opportunity for participants to encounter alternative 
task solutions and reflect about them, Mathews et al.
(1996) had their participants meet periodically in small 
discussion groups. The goal of these discussions was to 
produce a written policy describing how best to achieve 
target production. Mathews et al.(1996) reported much 
better performance in a condition involving group 
discussion relative to a condition in which learners worked 
individually. However, it is not clear whether the 
superior performance was due to the discussions or to the 
exposure to others' ideas that occurred in the discussions. 
Therefore, in Experiment 1 a condition was included in 
which participants were given copies of others' policies 
but not allowed to discuss those policies with other 
participants. This condition was called nominal groups to 
indicate that they had benefit of the group's ideas without 
actually meeting as a group. The nominal groups condition
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was compared to a group interaction condition in which 
discussion took place. Thus, the participants in the group 
interaction and nominal groups conditions were all exposed 
to alternative models but group discussions took place only 
in the group interaction conditions.
Exposure to alternative models was predicted to improve 
the quality of individual policies. This prediction 
follows from finding that people will seek disconfirming 
evidence of their hypotheses if they are made aware of the 
existence of alternative hypotheses (Kareev & Avrahami,
1995). Thus, policies should improve if invalid rules 
(hypotheses) contained in them can be rejected in favor of 
better rules in other's policies. The degree to which 
exposure to alternative models facilitated performance 
(experiential knowledge) was expected to depend on the 
presence of a third factor, reflective practice. Only when 
reflection and practice occur together is it expected that 
the two sources of knowledge become integrated (Gagne & 
White, 1978) .
Reflective Practice
Reflective practice was defined to be performance of 
the task under conditions in which task decisions are based 
on one's mental model (reflective knowledge) and one 
attends to the consequences of those decisions. Berardi- 
Coletta et al. (1995) found that requiring their 
participants to "think aloud" was not effective for
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increasing transfer performance in a problem solving task. 
However, when their participants were required to explain 
their thinking, thereby invoking metacognitive processes 
such as planning and monitoring, transfer was significantly 
improved. In Experiment 1, the effect of reflective 
practice was assessed by comparing the performance of 
participants who used a reflective practice procedure for 
training versus participants practicing the normal sugar 
production task (experiential practice).
One potential drawback of the reflective practice 
procedure of Mathews et al. (1996) was that participants 
were not free to choose which policy statement to evaluate. 
Instead, they attempted to predict which policy statement 
would be applied by a computer simulation of their policy. 
In effect, the participants in Mathews et al. were 
attempting to guess what an expert, exemplified by the 
program simulating their policy, would do in the current 
situation if restricted to using only the participant's 
policy. Berry and Broadbent (1987) found that participant 
control of the timing of explanations, as opposed to 
experimenter control, was important for learning. Also, 
according to some recent theorizing in Artificial 
Intelligence (AI), users of expert systems should be more 
likely to accept and therefore use a system if they are 
allowed to participate in the construction of explanations 
of the behavior of the expert system (Ford, Canas, &
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Coffey, 1993). Possibly, giving the participants control 
over which policy statement to evaluate would help them 
remember the status of their policy statements as they 
worked. Therefore, in the current experiment, the 
reflective practice procedure of Mathews et al. (1996) was 
modified by requiring the participants to choose a policy 
statement for evaluation. Subsequently, they had to 
predict the outcome of applying the policy statement. In 
order to distinguish between the procedure used by Mathews 
et al. (1996) and the modified procedure used in this 
experiment, the term "assisted reflective practice" will be 
used to refer to the modified procedure.
In summary, the first experiment investigated the roles 
of reflection, reflective practice, and exposure to 
alternative models when performing a complex control task 
(e.g., the sugar production task). Three predictions were 
made. First, improvements in ability to control sugar 
production would occur only when exposure to alternative 
models was accompanied by reflective practice. Similarly, 
the mental models of participants (i.e., written policies) 
were expected to be influenced only by the combination of 
reflective practice and exposure to alternative models. 
Third, combining reflective practice with exposure to 
alternative models was expected to lead to greater 
integration of reflective and experiential knowledge.
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Method
Participants and Design
One hundred fifty-three undergraduate students enrolled 
in introductory psychology courses at Louisiana State 
University were recruited to voluntarily participate in 
return for extra-credit.
The experiment was arranged as a factorial design 
comprising three factors: exposure to other's policies 
(group interaction vs nominal groups vs no exposure), 
practice mode (assisted reflective practice vs experiential 
practice), and session. Additionally, two control groups, 
practice-only and predict-only, were included. Neither 
control condition required participants to write a policy. 
The practice-only condition is a baseline against which to 
compare the effect of reflective practice.
The two control conditions differed from one another 
only in the practice task performed each session. During 
practice, participants in the predict-only condition were 
required to predict the resulting sugar production on each 
trial of practice (prediction task) . Comparisons between 
the practice-only control and the predict-only control were 
used to measure the effect of unassisted reflection. 
Comparisons between the practice-only control and the no 
exposure/experiential condition were used to evaluate the 
effect of writing a policy.
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The two primary dependent variables were performance as 
indicated by the average unsigned deviation from target 
production during the test phase and quality of the final 
policy. Policy quality was measured by using the policy to 
simulate performance of the sugar production task. The 
average unsigned deviation from target production achieved 
by the simulated policy was taken to be the policy quality. 
The simulation procedure is described in Appendix A. 
Procedure
Participants were tested in groups ranging from three 
to six individuals. Each group was randomly assigned to 
one of the eight conditions. Regardless of condition, all 
participants completed three sessions, one per day. For 
all participants, the three sessions were completed within 
seven days. Figure 1 depicts the sequence of tasks 
performed in each session by the participants. As shown in 
Figure 1, participants performed three basic tasks each 
session: (1) practice; (2) test; and (3) writing individual 
policies. Additionally, participants in the nominal groups 
and group interaction conditions began the second and third 
sessions by forming a group policy.
First session. In the first session, all participants 
were told that they were to take on the role of manager of 
a simulated sugar production factory. They were informed 
that their job was to learn how to achieve and maintain a 
target level of sugar production by interacting with the
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Figure 1. General sequence of tasks performed by 
participants each session in Experiment 1. Participants 
in the no exposure conditions did not construct group 
policies.
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simulation. They were further informed that the only 
variable they could control was the size of workforce used 
at the simulated sugar production factory. Thus, their 
task was to leam the relationship between workforce size 
and production level. Participants were also told that 
they would have additional tasks but would be given 
instructions at the appropriate time.
After receiving instructions, participants were given 
30 minutes to practice or interact with the simulation 
program. In all conditions but predict-only the simulation 
program was the standard sugar production task. In the 
predict-only condition, the prediction task replaced the 
sugar production task as the practice task. The sugar 
production task and prediction task are described below.
After practicing for 30 minutes, all participants 
performed the test. The test comprised four blocks of 10 
trials of the sugar production task. The participants were 
allowed up to 30 minutes to complete the test. The 
participants were informed that their goal was to stay as 
close as possible to the target production level.
After completing the test, each participants, except 
those in the two control conditions, were given 15 minutes 
to write down his or her policy for controlling sugar 
production. This completed the first session.
Second and third session. In all conditions but the 
two control conditions, participants were returned their
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written policies from the previous session. The policies 
were inscribed with a rating. Participants were told that 
the rating indicated how well another manager was aÜDle to 
perform the sugar production task when using their written 
policy as a guide. The rating procedure is described below 
under the heading of policy feedback.
After receiving an explanation of the ratings, 
participants in the nominal groups and group interaction 
conditions were given 15 minutes to form a group policy 
before proceeding to the practice-test-write policy 
sequence followed in the first session. The group policy 
formation procedure is described below. Participants in 
the no exposure conditions did not construct group 
policies.
The same practice-test-write policy sequence used in 
the first session was followed for the second and third 
sessions. However, before beginning to practice, all 
participants (except controls) were told that they would 
have to write a new policy at the end of the session and 
therefore should be thinking about how to improve their 
policy as they practiced.
To investigate the effect of reflective practice, the 
practice task was changed as follows for the second and 
third sessions. Participants in reflective practice 
conditions (except for controls) performed the assisted
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reflective procedure instead of the sugar production task 
during the practice portion of the session.
The test portion of the second and third sessions was 
the same 40 trial sequence as in the first session.
However, this time, participants were allowed to refer to 
their written policies from the previous session as they 
performed the test.
At the end of the session, participants were instructed 
to write new policies based on the performance of their old 
policies. They were informed that they could include any 
or all of their old policies in the new ones. After the 
end of the third session, all participants were debriefed 
and given a slip for their extra credit points.
Tasks
Sugar production task. Experiment 1 used the sugar 
production task used by Berry and Broadbent (1984) and as 
described in the discussion of Mathews et al. (1996). This 
is a computer-based task in which participants imagine they 
are in charge of a factory that produces sugar. The 
participants attempted to achieve and maintain a specified 
level of an output variable, sugar production, by 
controlling the number of workers employed by a simulated 
sugar-production factory. On each task trial, the computer 
presented to the participant a current level of sugar 
production. The participant responded by choosing and 
entering the number of workers to be employed. The
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computer then updated and displayed the new sugar 
production level.
Task trials were grouped into blocks of ten trials and 
each block began with a randomly selected production level. 
Figure 2 shows the graphical display seen by participants. 
Sugar production level is represented on the vertical axis 
of the graph. The dashed horizontal line shows the target 
production level. The horizontal axis represents the 
sequence of trials. The number of workers entered on each 
trial is displayed on the horizontal axis. Each sugar 
production output is represented by an 'X* on the graph.
At the end of each block, the display was cleared and a new 
graph displayed for the next block of trials.
Sugar production was allowed to vary from 1000 tons to 
12000 tons. Participants were allowed to select a number 
of workers ranging from 100 to 1200 in multiples of 50.
The target production was fixed at 6000 tons.
The relationship between number of workers and sugar 
production was identical to that used by Mathews et al. 
(1996) . The main dependent measure was the mean unsigned 
deviation from target production, in tons, across a block 
of ten trials. Because the target production level was 
always 6000 tons, the dependent measure could vary from a 
minimum of zero, if on target for every trial, to a maximum 
of 6000. Chance performance was defined as the mean 
unsigned deviation that would be achieved by entering a
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Workers: 400 250 300 300
Current production level is 2000 tons. 
Current workforce size is 300 workers.
Enter number of workers = » _
Figure 2. Graphical display seen by a participant 
performing the sugar production task. The target 
production is represented by the dashed horizontal line and 
the production level achieved on each trial is indicated by 
an ’X' . Number of workers used on each trial is recorded 
below the horizontal axis.
36
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
random value for workers on every trial. Chance 
performance was thus determined to be 4206 tons.
In order to minimize variability in the dependent 
measure, the effect of the random element was removed from 
the deviation score before submitting the data for 
analysis. The random element was removed by recomputing 
the production level that would have been achieved on each 
trial without the random element in the equation.
Assisted reflective practice. The assisted reflective 
practice procedure required participants to explicitly 
state which particular statement of their written policy 
(their reflective knowledge of the task) they were 
following when they made their decisions about the number 
of workers to use. On each trial, the computer prompted 
them to enter an identifier (statement number) for the 
statement or rule they thought best applied in the current 
situation. They were also prompted to enter the number of 
workers to be used according to the rule, and the 
production level they expected to achieve. After entering 
this information, the computer calculated and displayed the 
new production level. At this time, the participant was 
given the opportunity to repeat the trial by entering a 
different number of workers.
Prediction Task. Participants in the predict-only 
control condition performed a modified version of the sugar 
production task during their practice sessions. On each
37
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
trial of the prediction task, after entering a worker 
level, they were prompted by the computer to predict what 
the resulting production would be. After entering their 
prediction, the computer calculated and displayed the new 
production level.
Policy feedback. During the one-day interval between 
sessions, the written policies were assigned a rating 
indicating their quality. At the beginning of all but the 
first session, the rated policies were returned to the 
participants in order to give them feedback about the 
validity of their reflective knowledge.
The ratings were determined by using them to perform 
the sugar production task for 20 trials. On each trial, a 
rater selected the most appropriate rule from the policy 
and entered the indicated number of workers. The most 
appropriate rule was considered to be the one that matched 
the current situation and was the most specific in its 
range of application. Consider, for example, the two 
following rules: (1) "if you are above the target 
production of 6000 then you should decrease the size of the 
workforce"; and (2) "if current production level is between 
8000 and 10000 tons then you should use 800 workers." Both 
rules would be applicable to any trial on which current 
production level is 9000 tons. However, the second rule is 
more specific (i.e., applicable in fewer situations) and 
would be chosen by the rater. On trials where no rule
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applied, the rater entered the same number of workers used 
on the previous trial, unless it was the first trial. In 
this situation the rater entered a randomly selected number 
of workers. On trials where the policy indicated only a 
range of workers (e.g., more workers, or a high number of 
workers) the following actions were taken: (a) "more, or
less, workers than X" was interpreted as a randomly 
selected value of workers between X and the maximum or 
minimum number of workers allowed, respectively; (b) "a 
high, or low, number of workers" was taken to mean a 
randomly selected number of workers above 750 or below 450 
respectively; and (c) "an increasing, or decreasing, number 
of workers" was interpreted the same as in (a). A random 
number generator (computer program) assisted the rater in 
selecting random values.
Each policy was assigned a rating indicating its 
quality according to the average unsigned deviation from 
target. The policy ratings, described below, were 
inscribed on the policies. Policies were rated as follows: 
EXPERT - deviation less than 1000 tons, GOOD - deviation 
greater than or equal to 1000 tons and less than 2500 tons, 
SATISFACTORY - deviation greater than or equal to 2500 tons 
and less than 4000 tons, and UNSATISFACTORY - deviation 
greater than or equal to 4000 tons.
Forming group policies. At the beginning of the second 
and third sessions, and after receiving copies of their
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rated policies written at the end of the previous session 
(see Figure 1) , participants in the group interaction 
conditions met for 20 minutes in order to form a group 
policy. Interactions of the groups were unstructured, that 
is, members were free to organize the process in any way 
they chose. The experimenter instructed them to combine 
their individual policies into a single written policy. 
After completing this process, the experimenter made copies 
of the group policy and distributed one to each group 
member to use during the subsequent practice and test 
procedures.
Participants in the nominal groups conditions did not 
discuss their policies. Instead, they received copies of 
the individual policies of the other members of their group 
and were instructed to form a single written policy based 
on those policies. They were instructed to use any rules 
from their own or others' policies that they wished.
Results and Discussion
The Effect of Assisted Reflective Practice on Reflective 
Knowledge
The final policies for all participants were evaluated 
by a computer simulation as described in Appendix A. The 
mean simulated performance of the final session policies is 
displayed in Table 1. Data from the two control conditions 
were not included in the analysis of reflective knowledge 
because participants did not write policies.
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Tahl P 1 - Mean absolute deviation from target by condition 






experiential 28.0 21.7 16.9 27.2
reflective 26.2 26.2 23.9 27.6
nominal groups
experiential 27.9 20.8 19.7 23.1
reflective 28.4 25.1 21.3 25.9
group interaction
experiential 26.4 20.7 13.0 15.8
reflective 28.0 28.1 25.6 31.0
controls
practice-only 27.4 21.6 19.9







Note. Means are expressed in hundreds of tons. For 
example, a mean of 28.0 means an average deviation of 2800 
tons off target. The rightmost column shows correlations 
between final policy quality and final performance.
* indicates p < .05.
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It was predicted that a combination of assisted 
reflective practice and exposure to alternative models was 
necessary for changing peoples’ mental models of the task 
(as reflected in their written policies). That is, an 
interaction between exposure to other's policies and 
practice mode was expected. Although the interaction 
between practice mode and exposure to other's policies was 
significant, F(2,109) = 5.76, MSE = 106.1, p = .004, its 
direction was not as expected- The overall effect of 
assisted reflective practice was negative, F(l,109) =
10.06, MSE = 106.1, p = .002. Test of simple main effects 
revealed that the effect of practice mode was only present 
for the group interaction condition where the exposure to 
alternative models was present and reinforced through group 
discussion, F(l,109) = 21.07, MSE = 106.1, p < .01.
Contrary to these results, Mathews et al. (1996) 
reported that reflective practice led to large improvements 
in policy quality for participants in their groups 
condition. A way to reconcile this difference in results 
is to examine the information available to the participants 
during reflective practice.
In Mathews et al. (1996), feedback to participants 
about policy quality was generated by simulating the 
policies with a computer program. To prepare them for 
simulation, the policies were first translated into sets of 
condition-action rules (e.g., if production is high, use
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fewer workers) . Policy statements that were ambiguous were 
not included in the simulation. The simulation program was 
a variant of a classifier system (Holland et al., 1986; 
Druhan & Mathews, 1989; Roussel & Mathews, 1990), which is 
a production system in which rules compete against each 
other based on strength (past success rate for each rule), 
specificity (number of conditions specified), and support 
(agreement in action with other rules) to control the 
system's response. In this way, the simulation not only 
evaluates the policy by using it to control sugar 
production, but it also adjusts the strength of the rules 
to optimize success with a given set of rules (Mathews et 
al., 1996).
The feedback received by the participants in Mathews et 
al. (1996) was a score indicating the success of the 
optimized policy controlling sugar production.
Additionally, any rules whose final strength at the end of 
the simulation was below a threshold value (indicating they 
never succeeded in the rule competition process in the 
simulation) were indicated as such by a note written 
directly on the policy. Thus participants received 
information about which rules were ineffective. This 
allowed learners to focus only on the most valid rules. By 
contrast, in the current experiment, participants were 
given only a global policy score indicating the quality of 
the policy as a whole.
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In addition to informing them about the relative 
effectiveness of each of their rules, the reflective 
practice procedure of Mathews et al. (1996) directed the 
participants' attention toward the best rule on each trial. 
On each trial the participants were required to predict how 
many workers their policy would use and which particular 
rule would be employed (by the simulation program) to set 
the size of the workforce. Following their responses, they 
received feedback on what workforce size their policy would 
have set in this situation and which rule was used.
As a result of these differences between the reflective 
practice procedures of Mathews et al. (1996) and the 
current experiments, participants in the experiment of 
Mathews et al. probably gained more experience with more 
valid rules and less experience with invalid rules.
Further, the more extensive feedback concerning the 
relative effectiveness of individual rules given by Mathews 
et al. (1996) may have helped their participants to improve 
their reflective knowledge by eliminating ineffective 
rules.
A qualitative look at policies in the group interaction 
conditions in the current experiment showed that reflective 
knowledge was drastically different across reflective and 
experiential conditions. The policies of participants 
performing experiential practice consisted largely of 
statements of specific situations (e.g., when production is
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3000 tons, use 500 workers) whereas policies of 
participants performing reflective practice rarely 
contained specific situations. The mean number of specific 
situations mentioned in the experiential and reflective 
conditions were 7.21 (S2 = 5.26) and .95 (SD = 2.67), 
respectively. Typical policy statements in the reflective 
practice condition were elaborations of the (invalid) 
belief that more workers produce more sugar (e.g., if 
production is below target, then add 50 to 100 workers). 
Almost as frequent were references to patterns of sugar 
output across several consecutive trials and the 
corresponding response. For example, "if production 
changed from high to low, then production level will 
probably increase this trial, therefore use less workers to 
compensate for the expected increase."
These differences in participants' conceptions of the 
sugar production task show that assisted reflective 
practice did have a powerful influence on reflective 
knowledge, even if that influence was negative. Although 
it was contrary to the predicted effect, it is consistent 
with findings of implicit learning studies in which rule 
search fails (e.g., Reber 1976; Reber et al., 1980). These 
results, along with the interpretation of the differences 
between the reflective practice task of Mathews et al. and 
assisted reflective practice also suggest that presenting 
learners with a few valid and specific situations might be
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beneficial. This possibility is taken up in subsequent 
experiments.
The Effect of Reflective Practice on Task Performance
It is assumed that experiential knowledge is best 
measured by the ability to control sugar production. Thus, 
task performance during each test session is taken to be an 
index of experiential knowledge. Table 1 displays the mean 
performance in each condition across the three test 
sessions.
Performance means were analyzed within a repeated 
measures ANOVA. The three factors included in the ANOYA 
were session, practice mode, and exposure to other's 
policies. Session was the repeated factor. The two 
control conditions, practice-only and predict-only were 
excluded from this analysis and are addressed later.
Performance improved across sessions, F (2,218) = 37.44, 
MSE = 41.6, p < .0001, indicating that participants were 
gaining experiential knowledge. Participants in 
experiential conditions consistently outperformed their 
reflective counterparts, F(l,109) = 10.90, MSE = 137.8, p < 
.001, contrary to the expected benefit of reflective 
practice. The interaction between practice mode and session 
was also statistically significant, F(2,218) = 8.98, MSE = 
41.6, p < .0001. The pattern of means suggested that the 
negative effect of reflective practice increased across 
trials. To interpret this interaction, tests of simple
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main effects were performed to compare reflective against 
experiential at each level of session. The error term for 
these tests was formed by pooling the between-subjects and 
within-subjects error terms (see, Kirk, 1982, for an 
explanation of the procedure) and the significance level 
(alpha) was adjusted using Bonferroni's procedure. The 
practice mode effect was not present at session 1, F(l,327) 
= .005, MSE = 73.65. This was expected because 
participants in the reflective and experiential conditions 
were treated identically at the first session. The effect 
of practice mode was statistically significant at sessions 
2 and 3, F(l,327) = 11.36, MSE = 73.65, p < .01, and 
F(l,435) = 19.74, MSE = 73.65, p < .01, respectively.
The next analysis of performance focused on the final 
session where one would expect any treatment effects to be 
the greatest. Data from sessions 1 and 2 were excluded 
from this analysis. These results also can be directly 
compared to the findings for reflective knowledge discussed 
above.
Participants in the experiential conditions 
outperformed participants in the reflective conditions,
F (1,109) = 16.05, MSE = 87.9, p = .0001. There was no main 
effect of exposure to other's policies, F(2,109) = .19,
MSE = 87.9, p > .05, but the interaction between practice 
mode and exposure to other's policies was significant, 
F(2,109) = 3.20, MSE = 87.9, p = .045. Tests of simple
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main effects showed that the practice mode effect was 
marginal for the no exposure condition, F(l,109) = 5.58,
MSE =87.9, p = .03, nonsignificant for nominal groups, 
cuid significant for the group interaction condition 
F (1,109) = 17.3, MSE =87.9, p < .01. Inspection of the 
means shows the effect of practice mode largest in the 
group interaction condition (M = 13.04 vs M = 25.57 for 
experiential and reflective conditions, respectively) .
Other than the marginal effect of reflective practice 
for the no exposure condition, the results for experiential 
knowledge were the same as those for reflective knowledge. 
Thus, the same positive effects of group discussion and 
experiential practice were found for reflective knowledge 
and experiential knowledge.
The final analysis of experiential knowledge 
investigated differences between the two control conditions 
and the no exposure/experiential condition. Recall that 
participants in the practice-only control condition were 
treated the same as those in the no exposure/experiential 
condition, except that the practice-only controls did not 
write a policy at the end of each session. Thus, a 
comparison between these two conditions will reveal any 
effect of post-task reflection in the form of writing a 
policy. Participants in the predict-only control condition 
also did not write a policy. However, the prediction task 
can be considered as an unassisted reflective practice
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task. Thus, the comparison between the two control 
conditions will allow an assessment of the effect of 
unaided reflection.
The three conditions differed in final session 
performance, F(2,57) = 6.04, MSE = 105.0, p = .004. 
Tukey/Kramer pairwise comparisons revealed that policy 
writing had no effect on performance; the difference 
between practice-only and no exposure/experiential was not 
significant, Q(57) = 1.35, p > .05. However, the 
requirement to predict sugar production on each trial 
significantly hurt performance relative to the practice- 
only controls, û(57) = 3.42, p < .05. Thus, unaided 
reflection actually hurt performance.
It is possible that the consistent negative effect of 
reflection across all conditions arose out of differences 
in the number of practice trials experienced by the 
experiential and reflective learners. Because reflective 
practice requires slow and deliberate responding, learners 
in reflective conditions might simply have experienced 
fewer practice trials. An examination of data from 
practice sessions showed that experiential and reflective 
learners completed an average of 1092.8 = 413.0) and
440.9 (SD = 237.9) trials, respectively. A correlation 
analysis was performed to ascertain the contribution of 
accumulated practice to performance on the final test. The 
results showed that the number of practice trials was
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significam.tly correlated with test performance/ r = -.283, 
p < .05. However, the number of practice trials is 
confounded with practice mode. Therefore, a semi-partial 
correlation coefficient was computed in which the 
correlation between test performance euid practice mode was 
removed from the correlation between test performance and 
number of practice trials. The resulting semi-partial 
correlation coefficient was essentially 0, r = -.022,
E > .05. Therefore, the poor performance of reflective 
learners does not appear to be due to completion of fewer 
practice trials.
The Effect of Providing Alternative Models
As already noted, there were no main effects of 
exposure on either experiential or reflective knowledge. 
The provision of alternative models did interact with mode 
of practice. However, tests of simple main effects 
(reported above) showed that the interaction was explained 
by a large practice mode effect in the group interaction 
condition. The provision of alternative models alone 
(i.e., in the absence of group interaction) had no effect 
on performance.
The Effect of Group Discussion
As just discussed, the interaction between exposure to 
alternative models and practice mode was accounted for by 
the practice mode effect in the group interaction 
condition. Thus, group interaction did have some effect
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beyond that of exposure to alternative models. Recall also 
that the final policies of experiential and reflective 
learners in the group interaction condition were 
distinguished by a difference in the number of specific 
situations mentioned. Relative to the policies of 
reflective learners, the final policies of experiential 
learners tended to contain more statements referring to 
specific situations. This finding suggests that group 
discussion (post-task reflection) played some role in the 
development of learners' mental models. To examine this 
role, a simple qualitative analysis of policies was carried 
out.
To get a clear picture of the effect of group 
discussion, a comparison was made between the policies of 
the group interaction condition and the nominal groups 
condition. These conditions differed only by the presence 
or absence of group interaction. The policies chosen for 
examination were the group policies written at the 
beginning of the second practice session. Up until the 
time these policies were written, participants in the two 
conditions had been treated identically except for the 
group policy formation task (See Figure 1). Recall that 
each participant in the nominal groups condition formed his 
or her own group policy after being given copies of the 
policies of the other group members. By contrast, the 
participants in the group interaction condition met as a
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group to construct a single group policy. Because at this 
stage of the experiment experiential and reflective 
learners had been treated identically, the data from these 
two conditions were pooled for this analysis.
The number of specific situations mentioned for the 
nominal groups and group interaction conditions were 
tallied as before. To determine if the groups differed in 
their tendency to generate specific statements, each policy 
was categorized as follows: A general policy, if no 
specific situations were mentioned, or a specific policy, 
if one or more specific situations were mentioned. One- 
third of the policies in the nominal groups condition were 
categorized as specific policies compared to two-thirds of 
the policies of the group interaction condition. This 
difference was marginally significant, ^  = 3.334, p =
.072.
Although not strong, this evidence suggests that post­
task reflection might play a role in the interaction 
between practice mode and exposure to alternative models. 
Possibly, group discussions lead to more specific and 
better quality policies but reflective practice can subvert 
the process. Conversely, experiential practice may 
interact positively with the more specific policies to lead 
to good performance.
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Integration of Reflective and Experiential Knowledge
As a way of assessing integration between reflective 
and experiential knowledge eind as check on the validity of 
the procedure for measuring policy quality, correlations 
between policy quality and performance were computed.
Large correlations cannot prove that there was integration 
(agreement) between experiential and reflective knowledge 
nor can it prove that the measurement of policy quality was 
valid. However, very small correlations would indicate 
either lack of integration or lack of validity. The 
correlations are displayed in the rightmost column of Table
1.
Correlations were large and statistically significant 
for all except the nominal groups/reflective condition. A 
scatter-plot for the nominal groups/reflective condition 
was examined to check for any spurious data that might 
explain the lack of correlation. That check revealed that 
the small correlation was not accounted for by any spurious 
data points.
These correlation results suggest that learners were 
able to integrate their experiential and reflective 
knowledge of the task. However, this may sometimes hurt 
rather than help performance (e.g., in the group 
interact ion/reflective practice condition) . The one 
nonsignificant correlation in the nominal groups/reflective 
practice condition indicates that learners in this
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condition were unable to make sense of the wealth of 
information they were provided with.
The results of experiment 1 suggested that the 
specificity of learners' mental models was related to their 
ability to control sugar production; the policies of 
participants in the best performing condition 
(experiential/group interaction) tended contain many 
statements of specific situations. Further, reflective 
practice led learners to generate very general rules of low 
validity. Experiment 2 examined this relationship by 
providing some learners with hints consisting of specific 
or concrete situations illustrating how to control sugar 
production. The question addressed was whether providing 
these hints would prevent reflective practice from causing 
learners to generate overly general policies.
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EXPERIMENT 2 
Introduction.
One possible explanation for the negative effect of 
assisted reflective practice in Experiment 1 is a tendency 
to seek or create only general rules, which are not very 
useful in performing the task. I refer to this tendency as 
reflective abstraction error. Perhaps participants in the 
high performing group interaction/experiential practice 
condition avoided the error by not reflecting while 
performing the task. Consequently, the group discussion 
was focused more on concrete experiences or cases in which 
they successfully controlled sugar production rather than 
abstract rules about the relations between workers and 
production.
Experiment 2 attempted to inhibit participants' 
tendency to create overly general rules (i.e., reflective 
abstraction error) by giving them a hint describing 
concrete or specific situations. The hint comprised valid 
work force levels for four specific situations. It was 
presented to some participants at the beginning of the 
second and third practice sessions. It was predicted that 
the hint would induce learners to switch to a strategy of 
encoding the task as specific condition-action rules in a 
manner similar to participants in the group 
interaction/experiential condition of Experiment 1. The 
consequence of encoding the task as specific situations
55
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
would be to reduce the chance for reflective abstraction 
error and thus lead to a corresponding improvement in 
performance.
The hints can be construed also as a variation of the 
procedure in Experiment 1 for providing learners with an 
alternative model of the task. The difference is that the 
hints are provided by the experimenter and are valid. By 
contrast, the alternative models of Experiment 1 were 
provided by other participants and were likely to be 
invalid. Thus, Experiment 2 provides a more powerful test 




Fifty-two undergraduate students enrolled in 
introductory psychology courses at Louisiana State 
University were recruited to voluntarily participate in 
return for extra-credit.
Three experimental conditions were examined: hint/ 
experiential practice, hint/assisted reflective practice, 
and a no hint/experiential practice control condition. As 
in the previous experiment, session was a within-subjects 
factor.
The primary dependent variable was performance as 
indicated by the average unsigned deviation from target
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production. An additional dependent measure, policy 
quality, was assessed as it was in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Participants were tested in groups of three to six
individuals. Each group was randomly assigned to one of
the three conditions. Regardless of condition, all
participants completed three sessions, one per day. For
all participants, the three sessions were completed within
seven days. The procedure was identical to that followed
in Experiment 1 for the no exposure conditions except for
the provision of the hints described below. That is, all
participants were exposed only to their own policies or to
an experimenter-provided hint. Participants did not
discuss their polices with others in any conditions .
Participants in the hint conditions received a hint in
the form of a typed text at the beginning of the second and
third sessions. They were told that the hint would help
them learn to control sugar production. The hint was taken
away at the beginning of the test phase for each session.
The hint was as follows:
The number of workers should always follow the level of 
production. That is, when production is high, you need 
a lot of workers and when production is low, you need 
few workers. Similarly, when production is near the 
middle, you should use a moderate level of workers, not 
high and not low. Below are four specific examples.
If production is 1000 tons, then use 350 workers.
If production is 4000 tons, then use 500 workers.
If production is 7000 tons, then use 650 workers.
If production is 10000 tons, then use 800 workers.
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Results and Discussion 
The Effect of the Hint on Strategy
The number of specific situations mentioned in each 
participant's policy was tallied. A median test for 
independent groups (Siegel & Castellan, 1988) revealed that 
there were differences across conditions in the number of 
specific situations mentioned, (2) = 17.79, p < .05. The 
mean number of specific situations mentioned was 1.96,
5.82, and 3.95, for the control, hint/experiential, and 
hint/reflective conditions, respectively. The two hint 
conditions did not differ from each other, = .017, p
> .05, but both differed from the control condition, X"(D 
= 12.78, B < .05.
The Effect of the Hint on Reflective Knowledge
Although provision of the hint did cause participants 
to mention more specific situations in their policies, this 
does not guarantee that the resulting policies were more 
valid. To answer that question, the final policies for all 
participants were simulated as in Experiment 1. The mean 
performances for the simulated final policies are displayed 
in Table 2.
The performance of the simulated policies differed 
across the three conditions, F (2,49) = 10.37, MSE = 145.8, 
p = .0002. However, only the hint/experiential condition 
was better than controls, û(49) = 6.34, p < .05. The 
hint/reflective condition did not differ from the control
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Table 2. Mean absolute deviation from target by condition 
and session in Experiment 2.
Session
Condition 1 2 3
Final
Policy r
no hint/experiential 30.0 26.2 21.5 29.55 .24
hint/experiential 28.6 9.4 6.9 10.68 .60*
hint/reflective 29.9 14.7 10.7 24.54 .31
Note. Means are expressed in hundreds of tons. For 
example, a mean of 28.0 means an average deviation of 2800 
tons off target. The rightmost column shows correlations 
between final policy quality and final performance.
* indicates p < .05.
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condition, ^(49) = 1.81, g > .05. Thus, assisted 
reflective practice had the same destructive effect on 
reflective knowledge as it did in Experiment 1.
The Effect of the Hint on Task Performance
The three conditions differed overall, F(2,49) = 8.91, 
MSE = 182.2, p = .0005 and performance improved across 
sessions, F(2,98) = 93.34, MSE = 40.6, p < .0001. The 
interaction between condition and session was also 
statistically significant, F(4,218) = 8.98, MSE = 40.6, p < 
.001. Tests of simple main effects showed that condition 
was not significant at the first session. This was 
expected because participants in all conditions were 
treated the same. However, performance differed across 
treatments for the second, F (2,147) = 14.68, MSE = 87.8, p
< .01, and third session, F(2,147) = 11.50, MSE = 87.8, p
< .01.
Participants in both hint conditions performed better 
than controls during the final session. The difference 
between the hint/experiential and hint/reflective 
conditions was not significant, û(49) = 1.612, p < .05. 
Recall that in Experiment 1 reflective practice reduced 
both the final level of task performance and the final 
policy quality, relative to experiential practice.
Providing the hint in Experiment 2 overcame the negative 
impact of reflective practice on task performance but not 
on final policy quality. This result suggests an increased
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dissociation between experiential and reflective knowledge 
under conditions of reflective practice.
Further evidence of this dissociation is the lack of a 
significant correlation between final policy quality 
(reflective knowledge) and final test performêince 
(experiential knowledge). Reflective and experiential 
knowledge were correlated in the experiential/hint
condition, r = .60, p < .05, but not in the reflective/hint
condition, r = .31, p > .05. The lack of a significant
correlation in the no hint control condition is puzzling in
that this condition was identical to the no 
exposure/experiential condition of experiment 1 where a 
significant correlation was found. There is no explanation 
of this inconsistency between experiment 1 and experiment
2.
The next experiment explored this dissociation. 
Specifically, the reflective practice procedure was 
modified in an attempt to overcome the dissociation between 
experiential and reflective knowledge. Additionally, the 
next experiment incorporated a transfer task in order to 
investigate the flexibility of Icnowledge in the sugar 
production task.
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EXPERIMENT 3 
Introduction
In Experiment 2, the hint improved performance but did 
not improve policy quality when learners practiced 
reflectively, suggesting an increased dissociation between 
reflective and experiential knowledge. In response to that 
finding, the reflective practice procedure of Experiments 1 
and 2 was replaced by a simpler method for fostering 
reflective practice. In Experiment 3, participants in the 
reflective practice conditions were provided with paper and 
pencil during performance of the task and encouraged to 
record their behavior aind its results while performing the 
task. They were advised to use their notes to help them 
with their decisions about workforce size. The use of 
cognitive artifacts like pencil and paper is characteristic 
of reflective thought (Norman, 1993).
It was expected that the use of pencil and paper would 
cause participants to "stop and think" as they worked 
(Gagne & Smith, 1962). Further, it would serve as external 
memory and thus lessen the demand for cognitive resources 
as they worked. Participants in the experiential 
conditions were not allowed to use pencil and paper thereby 
removing support for reflective thought. It was assumed 
that removing this support would lead to a default to 
experiential processing.
62
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Experiment 3 also addressed the issue of flexibility of 
knowledge. Some researchers have suggested that implicitly 
(experientially) acquired knowledge is inflexible- For 
example, Dienes and Fahey (1995) found that performance was 
at chance levels for situations which had not been 
experienced previously. That is, transfer of knowledge was 
highly specific (Berry & Dienes, 1993).
In Experiment 3, a transfer task was used to 
investigate flexibility of knowledge. During the final 
test phase, participants were asked to achieve a new 
(novel) target production on half of the trials. If 
experiential knowledge is as specific as claimed then 
performance on new targets should be near chance.
Because the hint had such a powerful effect on 
performance in Experiment 2, it was included here to 
investigate its effect on transfer. Two levels of hint 
were examined, a general hint that mentioned only relative 
values for workers and production, and a specific hint that 
gave four specific situations in addition to the general 
hint for controlling sugar production. It was expected 
that the general hint would show the most transfer to the 
new target level. The specific hint applied only to the 
old target level and thus it was not clear what effect it 
would have on performance during transfer.
63
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Method
Participants and Design
One hundred twenty-one undergraduate students enrolled 
in introductory psychology courses at Louisiana State 
University were recruited to voluntarily participate in 
return for extra-credit. As before, all participants were 
tested in groups of three to six individuals.
Three independent variables were arranged in a 
factorial design: practice mode (reflective vs 
experiential), hint (none vs general vs specific), and 
target level (old vs new) . The no hint/experiential 
condition was considered to be a control condition. Target 
level was a within-subjects factor. The repeated factor of 
session was also included as in the previous two 
experiments.
Procedure
Each group of three to six individuals was randomly 
assigned to one of the six conditions. The general 
procedure was identical to that followed in Experiment 2 in 
that each session consisted of a practice phase and a test 
phase. However, the original, or old, target level was 
exchanged for a new target level for half of the trials 
during the test phase of the third session.
Two target levels were used: 4000 and 8000. Each 
individual was randomly assigned to one of the target 
levels for the first two sessions. This was considered the
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"old" target level. Midway through the test phase of the 
final session, the target level was switched to the other 
target for the remaining trials. Participants were warned 
about the change and were told to do their best at 
achieving the new target level. Thus, each participant 
performed twenty trials with each target level.
During the test phase of each session, participants in 
the reflective conditions could use any notes they had made 
during the practice phase. Thus, any superiority of the 
reflective conditions could be due to having this aid 
during the test and not due to reflection during practice. 
To control for this advantage, an extra test phase was 
included at the end of the experiment. At the end of the 
third session, and after all participants had written their 
final policy, all notes and policies were taken from the 
participants and they completed twenty more test trials. 
During this test, the same two target levels were used as 
before. The old target level was used for the first ten 
trials and the previously new target level for the final 
ten trials.
Results and Discussion 
The Effect of Reflection (Paper and Pencil)
Mean test performance across sessions (collapsed over 
old and new target levels) is displayed in Table 3. There 
were no differences between the experiential and reflective 
conditions, F(l,115) = .25, MSE = 139.9, p = .62, nor was
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Tahlf» 3- Mean absolute deviation from target by condition 












































Note. Means are expressed in hundreds of tons. For 
example, a mean of 28.0 means an average deviation of 2800 
tons off target.
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the interaction between practice mode and hint significant, 
F(2,115) = .41, MSB = 139.9, p = .67. It is quite 
surprising that being allowed to record one's interactions 
with the task had no effect on performance. One would 
expect that, at least on occasion during the test, a 
participant would encounter a situation similar to one 
experienced during practice and could therefore benefit 
from a written record of that experience. But, obviously, 
this did not happen. Indeed, the same analysis performed 
on the simulated final policy performance (Table 3) 
revealed no main effects or interactions for practice mode 
or hint (all Fs < 1). It seems the ability to keep a 
written record did not influence policies either.
Although reflection had no effect on either policy 
quality or performance, it might have influenced the 
dissociation between experiential and reflective knowledge 
found in the previous experiment. The correlations between 
experiential and reflective knowledge (Table 3) are all 
small and not significantly different from zero. This 
would seem to suggest that there was a strong dissociation 
present across all conditions. However, the design of the 
transfer task allowed participants' policies to be 
ambiguous with respect to the target level to which they 
applied. Recall that the final polices were written after 
the final test. In the final test, target levels were 
changed in order to investigate transfer. Subsequently,
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when participants wrote their final policies, most did not 
state whether their policies applied to old or new targets, 
or both. Neither did they ask the experimenter whether 
they should specify target levels in their policies. Thus, 
the low correlations are not necessarily indicative of a 
dissociation.
The Effect of Hints on Task Performance
The effect of hint type was significant, F{2,115) = 
7.13, MSE = 139.9, p = .0012, and interacted with the 
session variable, F (4,230) = 5.73, MSE = 39.6, p = .0002. 
The effect of hint was not present at session 1 (F<1), but 
was significant for session 2, F (2,345) = 13.67, MSE =
73.0, p < .01, and for session 3, F(2,345) =5.27, MSE =
73.0, p < .01. Both hint conditions were superior to 
controls (no hint) at session 3 but did not differ from 
each other.
An effect of hint type on experiential knowledge 
(performance) without a corresponding effect on policy 
quality is consistent with the differential impact of hint 
in the hint/reflective condition of experiment 2. This 
demonstrates that learners draw upon distinct knowledge for 
performing and for communicating (i.e., writing policies). 
Flexibility of Knowledge
Because practice mode had no effect on performance, 
data from experiential and reflective conditions were 
combined for the remaining analyses.
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Flexibility was assessed by measuring performance 
separately for old and new target levels. Mean 
performances for old and new targets are presented in Table 
4 under the heading "first transfer test." Additionally, 
the difference between performance on old and new targets 
is also displayed. Data from the first transfer test are 
considered first.
Performance was better for old targets than for new, 
F(l,118) = 91.88, MSE = 605.3, p = .0001. Looked at this 
way, there was negative transfer to new targets. However, 
performance on old targets is not the proper baseline for 
measuring transfer. One way to measure transfer is to 
compare performance on new targets relative to chance 
performance.
To ascertain whether performance on new targets was 
better than chance, 99 percent confidence intervals were 
constructed around performance means for new targets in 
each condition. These confidence intervals were inspected 
to see if they contained 42, which is chance performance. 
The upper bounds for all three confidence intervals were 
below 30 (hundred tons) which is well below 42, the 
deviation score achieved by random selection of worker 
levels. This indicates that performance on new targets was 
better than chance.
Hint level also interacted with target level, F(2,118)
= 4.58, MSE = 605.3, p = .012. To interpret the
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Table 4. Mean absolute deviation from target by type of 
hint and target before and after retention interval.
hint
first transfer test second transfer test
old new old-new old new old-new
none 17.5 24.7 -7.2 16.6 25.2 -8.6
general 12.0 19.7 -7.7 13.0 20.2 -7.2
specific 8.6 22.4 -13.8 9.8 18.2 -8.4
Note. Means are expressed in hundreds of tons. For 
example, a mean of 28.0 means an average deviation of 2800 
tons off target. The values in the columns labeled "old- 
new" indicate the difference in performance on old and new 
targets.
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interaction, Tukey/Kramer pairwise comparisons were made 
separately for old and new targets. The performance means 
on old targets were 17.5, 12.0, and 8.6, for the no hint, 
general hint, and specific hint condition, respectively. 
Both hint conditions were better than the no hint 
condition. Although the mean for the specific hint 
condition was lower than the mean for the general hint 
condition (8.6 vs 12.0), that difference was not 
significcint. Thus, hints were effective in improving 
performance, at least on old targets.
The performance means for new targets were 24.7, 19.7, 
and 22.4, for the no hint, general hint, and specific hint 
condition, respectively. No differences between the three 
conditions were significant. Thus, neither hint supported 
transfer to new targets during the first transfer test.
I now turn to the second transfer test. As in the 
first transfer test, the effect of target was significant, 
with performance on old targets being superior to 
performance on new targets, F(l,118) = 55.34, MSE = 709.2, 
p = .0001. However, the interaction between target level 
and hint type was not present at the second transfer test, 
I < 1.
Tukey/Kramer pairwise comparisons computed for each 
target level revealed that the specific hint condition was 
superior to the no hint condition for both old and new 
targets. Thus, participants provided reflective knowledge
71
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in the form of a specific hint, were able to apply the hint 
to the new targets. The general hint condition did not 
differ from either the no hint condition or the specific 
hint condition.
Although the new target level is not truly "new" during 
the second transfer test (i.e., the new target level was 
experienced during the first transfer test), the 
superiority of the specific hint condition is surprising. 
After all, the specific hints only applied to the old 
target level and if followed for the new target would lead 
to poor performance. Apparently, the minimal experience 
learners got with the new target during the first transfer 
test enabled them to apply the hints to the new targets 
during the second transfer test.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This investigation examined the effects of reflection, 
exposing learners to others' ideas about the task, and the 
opportunity to discuss those ideas with other learners. An 
additional concern of this investigation was the effect 
that reflection would have on the integration of reflective 
and experiential knowledge. In three experiments, the 
effectiveness of various kinds of reflective thinking, 
involving both within-task and post-task reflection, was 
investigated. Also, two ways of providing learners with 
alternative ideas about task behavior, exposure to other's 
policies and providing hints for task solution, were 
examined. Following a summary of the basic findings 
regarding knowledge integration, possible explanations and 
the theoretical implications will be discussed.
Simimarv of Findings 
Within-task Reflection
Several methods for eliciting within-task reflection 
were investigated. The simplest method was to give 
learners pencil and paper along with instructions to use 
them as they saw fit to help them learn the task 
(Experiment 3) . It was expected that pencil and paper 
would serve as external memory and lessen the demand for 
cognitive resources. The use of pencil and paper was also 
expected to cause participants to "stop and think", or
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perform more reflectively, as they worked (Gagne & Smith, 
1962).
Contrary to these expectations, no effect on learning 
was found. Performance and policy quality were the same in 
Experiment 3 whether participants had paper and pencil or 
not. This result confirms what others have argued is a 
tendency for people to default to an experiential mode when 
reflective strategies meet with difficulty (e.g.. Berry & 
Dienes, 1993; Reber, 1993).
Another method for eliciting within-task reflection 
during task performance was to require participants to 
predict the outcome of each selection of workforce size 
(prediction condition. Experiment 1). This method 
apparently was successful in eliciting reflection because 
the performance of participants in the prediction condition 
differed from that of participants in a non-prediction 
control condition. However, this kind of reflection led to 
worse rather than better performance. Thus, forcing 
learners to reflect as they learn can actually interfere 
with learning.
The final method for eliciting within-task reflection 
was assisted reflective practice which involved a computer 
program designed to assist learners in thinking about their 
policies for controlling sugar production and to help them 
evaluate their policies by using them to perform the task 
(Experiments 1 and 2).
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Assisted reflective practice was found to be quite 
damaging to learning and performance. The policies created 
by learners engaging in assisted reflective practice were 
less valid than those of learners not required to reflect 
as they practiced. Also, at the end of training, task 
performance was worse following assisted reflective 
practice compared to experiential (non-reflective) 
practice.
In summary, eliciting within-task reflection failed to 
improve learning in every condition investigated in these 
experiments. Contrary to my predictions, within-task 
reflection consistently led to worse performance relative 
to participants allowed to perform the task experientially. 
Further, there was evidence that within-task reflection led 
to less valid reflective knowledge. The simulated policies 
of participants in reflective conditions tended to perform 
worse than those of participants in experiential 
conditions.
That supported reflection could be so detrimental to 
learning was unexpected considering the number of studies 
finding beneficial effects of a variety of reflective 
processes (e.g., Ahlum-Heath & DiVesta, 1986; Berardi- 
Colleta et al., 1995; Biemiller & Meichenbaum, 1992; Chi et 
al., 1987, 1994; Gagne & Smith, 1962; Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; 
Mathews et al., 1996; McGeorge & Burton, 1989; Stanley et 
al., 1989; Trudel & Payne, 1995; Wilder & Harvey, 1971).
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The size aoid robustness of this negative impact of 
reflective practice in these experiments justifies the 
creation of a name for this phenomenon: reflective 
abstraction error. The theoretical implications of 
reflection abstraction error are taken up later in this 
discussion.
Post-task Reflection
Two kinds of post-task reflection were investigated.
In one kind, participants wrote down their strategies for 
controlling sugar production at the end of each practice 
session. In the other kind of post-task reflection, 
participants met periodically in small groups to discuss 
their written strategies and create a group policy for 
controlling sugar production.
The requirement to write a strategy had no effect on 
performance. However, participation in group discussions 
had a significant effect on learning that varied according 
to whether within-task reflection was present. This 
interaction effect can be seen by comparing the nominal 
groups and group interaction conditions of Experiment 1.
In the nominal groups condition, participants received 
copies of the strategies of other group members. They 
were instructed to combine those policies, along with their 
own policy, into a single policy. Then they were 
instructed to evaluate this policy during subsequent 
practice sessions. Nominal groups participants were not
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allowed to discuss the policies with the other group 
members contributing the policies. In the group 
interaction condition, participants were allowed to see and 
evaluate each others policies and to discuss their policies 
with the goal of creating the best single group policy for 
controlling sugar production. Thus, they had the greatest 
opportunity for reflecting about their own and other's 
ideas.
The results showed that when participants were allowed 
to discuss their policies with other members, those who had 
assisted reflective practice performed much worse than 
those who had experiential practice. By contrast, in the 
nominal groups conditions (no group discussion), 
performance of those having assisted reflective practice 
did not differ from the performance of those having 
experiential practice. In addition, performance of the 
group interaction participants who had experiential 
practice exceeded that of participants in the nominal 
groups/experiential practice condition. This was the only 
condition in which reflection (group discussion) actually 
improved task performance.
These results suggest that the effect of post-task 
reflection (discussion) depends on the content of the 
discussion. The policies of participants in the 
experiential practice conditions contained significantly 
more examples of specific situations than the policies of
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participants in the assisted reflective practice 
conditions. Thus, the group discussions of experiential 
learners were more focused on specific situations 
encountered in the context of the task.
Exposure to Other's Policies
Another variable investigated for its effect on 
experiential and reflective knowledge was exposure to 
alternative task conceptions. It was hypothesized that 
conceptual change would be most likely to occur when 
learners have access to a variety of task conceptions.
Although access to alternative task conceptions, 
through exposure to other's policies, was predicted to lead 
to superior performance when combined with assisted 
reflective practice, it actually had no effect. In 
Experiment 1, there was little difference in performance 
between participants who had access only to their own 
policies (no exposure condition) and those who were allowed 
to evaluate other's policies (nominal groups condition). 
This finding suggests either that learners ignore ideas not 
generated by themselves or that they are unable to 
integrate those ideas into their own conception of the 
task. The lack of correlation (r=-.02) between performance 
and policy quality in the nominal groups condition suggests 
that participants were unable to integrate the policies of 
others with their own experiential knowledge. That is, 
their experiential knowledge, which controlled task
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performance, became dissociated from their reflective 
knowledge which was influenced by exposure to others 
policies.
However, when groups of participants were allowed to 
discuss each others policies the dissociation between 
experiential and reflective knowledge was eliminated. That 
is, in the group discussion conditions, experiential and 
reflective knowledge were significantly correlated and were 
affected similarly by manipulations of practice mode 
(experiential vs reflective practice) . Further, combining 
group discussion with exposure to other's policies actually 
facilitated task performance for participants practicing 
experientially.
Giving Learners Valid Hints
Only when participants were given valid hints about 
controlling sugar production (Experiment 2) did assisted 
reflective practice not significantly interfere with 
learning. Learners given hints about how to control sugar 
production performed near perfect by the final session and 
there was no difference in performance between experiential 
and assisted reflective practice, i^parently, when within- 
task reflection is directed toward valid cases (hints), the 
damaging effect of reflective practice is eliminated, or at 
least greatly reduced. However, even though performance 
was not negatively affected, learners performing assisted 
reflective practice still tended to develop less valid
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mental models as indicated by their poorer quality 
policies.
Giving learners hints also provided an opportunity to 
investigate the relative transfer of reflective knowledge 
provided in the hints, and experiential knowledge acquired 
from task experience. Experiential knowledge is commonly 
viewed as being inflexible and tied to specific perceptual 
cues (Berry & Dienes, 1993; Schacter, 1987) . In 
particular, positive transfer to new situations in the 
sugar production task is rare (Dienes & Fahey, 1995) . By 
contrast, reflective knowledge is generally viewed as 
flexible and applicable to novel situations (Baars, 1988) . 
The results of Experiment 3 suggest that this view may be 
too strong.
In Experiment 3, at the beginning of the second 
practice session, some participants were given hints 
specifying the correct response for four different 
situations. Those hints were valid for the target level 
used during practice sessions. However, at the final 
session the target level was changed for the transfer test, 
thereby rendering the specific content of the hints (e.g., 
if production is 3000 then use 400 workers) invalid. 
Clearly, participants could not literally apply the hints 
to perform the transfer test. They had to abstract or 
adapt this knowledge in order to apply it to the new target 
level. Thus, this transfer test taps a very abstract level
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of knowledge, or at the least, measures the use of abstract 
analogy during test.
In the first transfer test, participants given the 
hints performed no better on new targets than participants 
in the no-hint control condition. This suggests that 
reflective knowledge (i.e., knowledge acquired from hints) 
did not facilitate transfer. However, performance on new 
targets in both the hint and no-hint conditions was still 
better than chance performance. This suggests that the 
experiential knowledge learners gained from task experience 
did transfer to the new target level.
After a brief retention interval, during which all 
participants' written policies and notes were taken away, a 
second transfer test was given using the same new target 
levels as for the first transfer test. Of course, the new
target levels are no longer truly new as they were seen
during the earlier transfer test. However, participants 
had only minimal experience (20 trials) with the new 
targets.
Interestingly, during the second transfer test, 
participants that had received the specific hints performed 
better on new targets than the no-hint condition.
Remember, these hints were not literally valid for new
targets. Apparently, the minimal experience that 
participants received with the new targets during the first 
transfer test was sufficient for them to modify their
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reflective knowledge auid integrate it with their 
experiential knowledge, increasing their performance on the 
second transfer test. By contrast, participants who 
received only general hints (i.e., hints not referring to 
specific target levels) performed no better than no-hint 
controls on the second transfer test.
Knowledge Integration
Several investigations using the sugar production task 
and similar tasks have reported dissociations between 
experiential and reflective knowledge (e.g.. Berry & 
Broadbent, 1984, 1988; Stanley et al., 1989). One of the 
questions addressed in this investigation was whether 
engaging reflective thinking in the context of performing 
the task would lead to greater integration (less 
dissociation) of experiential and reflective knowledge.
The results of these experiments suggest that 
integration is most likely to occur when two conditions are 
met: 1) Reflection occurs following task performance in
the context of discussions with other learners about 
performing the task. 2) Reflection is focused on specific 
cases or direct experiences rather than abstracted theories 
or beliefs about the task. When these two conditions are 
not met, either performance will suffer, or dissociation 
will occur.
The evidence for condition 1 was the consistently poor 
performance of participants in the assisted reflective
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practice conditions relative to experiential practice, 
which contrasts with the good relative performance obtained 
in the group interaction/experiential practice condition of 
Experiment 1. Support for condition 2 was that the 
policies containing the most specific situations were 
associated with the best performance. Additionally, 
transfer performance was better in the specific hint 
condition relative to the general hint condition.
Explaining Reflective Abstraction Error 
Reflective abstraction error is defined as the tendency 
to seek, find, and believe in simple rules or explanations 
of one's own task performance that may be grossly 
inadequate. Reflective abstraction error was manifested 
through three basic findings. First, reflecting within- 
task about one's model of the task (assisted reflective 
practice), or merely thinking ahead about the results of 
one's actions (prediction task), significantly reduced the 
degree of learning as indicated by task performance.
Second, the mental models (written policies) of 
participants who reflected as they learned tended to be 
less valid and less specific than the mental models of 
experiential learners. Third, experiential and reflective 
knowledge tended to become dissociated when reflection 
occurred within-task and alternative ideas (other's 
policies in Experiment 1, or valid hints in Experiment 2) 
are provided to learners.
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These findings are generally consistent with those 
reported in the literature on implicit learning of 
artificial grammars. Learners studying letter-strings 
generated by an artificial grammar under instruction to 
discover the rules of the grammar (reflective learning) 
tend to perform worse on a subsequent discrimination test 
than do learners instructed only to memorize the letter- 
strings (experiential learning). Rule-search instructions 
seem to cause learners to misclassify consistently some 
nongrammatical strings as grammatical (Brooks, 1978; Reber, 
1976; Reber et al., 1980), indicating that they are 
following invalid rules.
Given that the rules of most artificial grammars are 
very complex and learners are given no feedback about the 
correctness of their developing rules, it is not surprising 
that they should fail to discover completely valid rules 
(Brehmer, 1980). However, the reflective practice 
procedure used in the current investigation was devised 
specifically to help learners discover the rules governing 
the sugar production task. They were allowed periodically 
to write down their rules. Additionally, they were given 
feedback about the overall quality of their written rules. 
Finally, eind most important, they were required, under 
conditions of assisted reflective practice, to evaluate 
their rules by following those rules as they controlled 
sugar production. Incredibly, all of this support
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contributed to poorer quality written policies which are 
evidence of less valid reflective knowledge. This support 
for reflection also contributed to poorer task performance.
Reflection abstraction error apparently can be 
prevented as demonstrated by Mathews et al. (1996).
Contrary to the findings reported here, Mathews et al.
(1996) found a large positive effect of reflective practice 
on both reflective knowledge (policy quality) cind 
performance using the same sugar production task and a 
reflective practice condition very similar to that employed 
in this study. The reason for the very different results 
in the two studies is most likely to be found in 
differences in the reflective practice procedures used in 
the two studies.
In the Mathews et al. (1996) study, policy feedback 
comprised both a global score indicating overall policy 
quality and information concerning the relative 
effectiveness of individual policy statements or rules. In 
effect, the scored policies returned to the participants at 
the beginning of a session in Mathews et al. (1996) were 
somewhat like the hints given participants in Experiments 2 
and 3 in the current investigation. Good rules were 
generally specific cases. Thus, the feedback pointed to 
these good specific rules that subjects included in their 
policies. Recall that the specific hints significantly 
improved performance and reflective knowledge.
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The reflective practice procedure of Mathews et al.
(1996) also instructed participants about which of their 
rules "best" applied in each situation during reflective 
practice. In a way, the simulation served somewhat as an 
expert coach guiding a student through the just the right 
actions at just the right time (Ericsson et al., 1993) 
during reflective practice.
In the current investigation, policies were returned to 
participants with a single score indicating the validity of 
the policy as a whole. Participants were not informed 
about the relative quality of individual rules or 
statements in their policies. Also, they were not guided 
as to which rule to apply during practice. The contrast in 
method and outcome between Mathews et al. (1996) and the 
experiments in the current investigation suggest that a key 
to thwarting reflective abstraction error is to keep 
reflection focused on specific experiences with the task. 
When learners are reflecting on their experiences with the 
sugar production task and not on their abstract theories or 
beliefs about the task, they are successful.
The performance of participants in the group 
interaction conditions of experiment 1 provides the 
strongest evidence for the importance of keeping reflection 
focused on task experiences. In those conditions, assisted 
reflective practice was most damaging; learners practicing 
reflectively performed much worse than those practicing
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experientially. More important, there was a striking 
difference between the written policies of the two 
conditions. Policies of learners having experiential 
practice tended to be lists of highly valid and specific 
situations (e.g., "when production is at 3000 tons, always 
use 500 workers"). By contrast, policies of learners 
having assisted reflective practice contained few 
references to specific situations. The only difference in 
procedure between the two conditions was the mode of 
practice (reflective vs experiential). Therefore, it could 
be that practice mode was completely responsible for the 
differences in performance. However, the written policies 
were qualitatively different in the two conditions. 
Consequently, during the group discussion periods, 
discussion was focused on different kinds of knowledge. It 
is possible that the differences in performance were due to 
this difference in discussion content. When discussion was 
focused on specific or concrete situations (e.g., in the 
experiential condition) performance benefitted. By 
contrast, when discussions were focused on general rules, 
performance suffered. This possibility is supported by the 
finding of Experiment 2 in which performance under 
reflective practice conditions was good when learners were 
given hints containing specific cases. That is, reflecting 
on one's possibly flawed understanding of the task while 
one leams can have a detrimental impact on understanding.
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This negative impact of reflective practice is contrary 
to what is typically found in studies of problem solving 
and transfer (Ahlum-Heath & DiVesta, 1986; Berry, 1983; Chi 
et al., 1989; Gagne & Smith, 1962; Wilder & Harvey, 1971). 
Good problem solvers are more likely to exhibit spontaneous 
use of metacognitive strategies in which they reflect on 
what they know or don't know and evaluate the success of 
their activities (Biemiller & Meichenbaum, 1992; Chi et 
al., 1987; Chi et al., 1994). Requiring solvers to justify 
or explain each step toward solution also has been found to 
facilitate problem solving (Berardi-Colleta et al., 1995; 
Chi et al., 1994).
An exception to this positive effect of reflective 
processing is found within a particular class of problems 
known as insight problems (Wertheimer, 1959). These are 
problems which have a high probability of leading to an 
impasse and whose solution is usually associated with an 
"ah ha" experience in which the solver suddenly obtains the 
solution (Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993). Schooler et 
al. (1993) found that a requirement to think aloud while 
working on insight problems reduced the likelihood of 
arriving at the correct solution. Their explanation of 
this result is that verbalization activates loiowledge and 
processes that overshadow the nonverbal processes necessary 
for insight to occur.
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Can "overshadowing" explain the negative effect of 
reflective practice? The main difficulty with this account 
is that the sugar production task does not have the central 
attribute of an insight problem. Insight problems are 
characterized by the sudden appearance of a solution. In 
the sugar production task insight should reveal itself in 
the form of discontinuous learning curves for individual 
learners. However, improvements in performance tend to be 
incremental for the sugar production task. Thus, insight 
does not describe the solution process in the sugar 
production task.
One might explain reflective abstraction error as the 
inevitable result of attempting to understand one's 
experience in the face of unreliable input. For example, 
it has been suggested that the poor quality of clinical 
judgment, as compared with other ençirically based 
approaches to judgment, follows from a combination of the 
unrepresentativeness of the cases experienced, a lack of 
timely and accurate feedback about one's judgments, and 
biases people have which prevent them from properly 
evaluating the evidence of their experiences (Brehmer,
1980; Camerer & Johnson, 1991; Klayman & Ha, 1985; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973). That is, the less than stellar 
performance of human judges and decision makers is the best 
they can do in a noisy environment.
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This diagnosis is most certainly correct. The problems 
of representativeness of experiences and paucity amd 
reliability of feedback are evident (Brehmer, 1980). Also, 
people's biases have been well documented (Kahneman,
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Klayman & Ha, 1985; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982) . However, the implication of this 
diagnosis is that the poor performance of human judges is 
due to an adaptive agent (human learner) being faced with 
an environment that is ill-structured. Thus, the fact that 
the learner ends up not well adapted to the task 
environment should not be conceived as an error but as the 
best solution in the absence of good "data”.
An important question to ask at this point is whether 
the sugar production task is just this sort of ill- 
structured task? The answer is, it is not. Feedback in 
the sugar production task is immediate and accurate, with a 
small exception made for the noise added to output. This 
suggests that reflective abstraction error is a response to 
something other than an ill-structured and noisy 
environment.
Perhaps the key to understanding the negative effect of 
reflective practice in the sugar production task is the 
nonlinear relation between number of workers used and sugar 
production. People tend to seek simple positive 
relationships between task variables (Hammond & Summers, 
1965; Sanderson, 1989; Sniezek, 1986). Participants
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reasonably expect that increasing the size of the workforce 
will always raise the level of production and similarly 
that using fewer workers will always lower the production 
level. That is, they assume a simple causative model in 
which each worker produces some fixed quantity of sugar 
(Sanderson, 1989). In fact, the relationship between 
production level and workforce size is more complex. The 
effect of changing the workforce will vary as a function of 
the production level achieved on the previous trial. An 
increase in the size of the workforce will sometimes raise 
production and sometimes lower production. As can be 
verified from the equation relating workers and production, 
production level will increase only when the number of 
workers selected is greater than one tenth of the current 
production level. For example, assume that on a trial the 
production level is 5000 tons and the current workforce 
size is 300. An increase of workers to 350 would lower 
production because 350 is less than one tenth of 5000. 
Assuming that 350 workers are selected, the resulting 
production would be 2000 (disregarding the random element) . 
Then if workers are increased again, to 400 workers, 
production level will now increase because 400 is greater 
than one tenth of 2000.
Learners required to reflect as they practice are 
apparently unable to discard this common sense model of the 
sugar production task. Even when faced with feedback that
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challenges the model (e.g., when an increase in workers 
leads to a decrease in production level) learners are 
apparently unable to change their representation of the 
task (e.g., Luchins, 1942). Perhaps the common sense model 
is protected from evidential challenges through the 
formation of exception rules that account for those 
situations in which the siitç)le model fails (e.g., Holland 
et al., 198G). Or, similarly, perhaps the simple model 
persists through a self-perpetuating encoding process in 
which all ambiguous or contrary evidence is interpreted as 
being consistent with the model (Lewicki, Czyzewska, &
Hill, 1997) .
Regardless of whether learners come to the task with 
strong beliefs that conflict with the task or they adopt 
those beliefs in the absence of a better model, the 
conditions of assisted reflective practice may strongly 
activate one's mental model. Once activated, it influences 
one’s interpretation of experience and thereby can lead to 
the abstraction of knowledge that is inconsistent with the 
task (e.g., Lewicki et al., 1997).
Feltovich, Spiro, and Coulson (1989) argue that people 
engage in a number of "conceptual biases" when faced with 
learning very complex material. These conceptual biases 
refer to tendencies to simplify complex concepts during 
acquisition. For example, when faced with comprehending a 
system with many interacting variables, one tends to focus
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on one or two variables at a time and attempt to put the 
system back together after all of the parts are understood. 
Unfortunately, when interactions are present, this can lead 
to a misunderstanding of the complete system. Thus, 
Feltovich et al. argue, misconceptions arise as a natural 
result of attempting to understand a complex system.
Further, the misconceptions arise out of actions that the 
learner takes to reduce the complexity.
It is not clear that this kind of analysis task 
complexity applies to the sugar production task (c.f.,
Hayes & Broadbent, 1988) . Although some authors have 
referred to this task as a complex system (e.g., Broadbent 
et al., 1986), its complexity is not due to large numbers 
of interacting variables. Its workings are very simple and 
learners receive immediate and accurate feedback about 
their performance. Whatever complexity it exhibits is due 
to violations of learners' expectations in terms of the 
kinds of relations that they seek (e.g., Hammond & Summers, 
1965; Sniezek, 1986). Thus, the difficulties that learners 
have are not due to any intrinsic complexity of the task, 
but rather to the "perceived" complexity and an 
incongruence between their expectations and the actual 
behavior of the system.
Implications
The results of this investigation suggest that the best 
way to support reflection for novices beginning to learn a
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difficult task, and thereby prevent or reduce reflective 
abstraction error, is to direct their reflection toward the 
concrete data of experience with the task rather than the 
conjectures of their theories about the task. Experience, 
and our memories of it, are richer in detail than any 
theories of the phenomena producing the experience. Also, 
experiential knowledge does not seem to be so biased toward 
simple relations between variables. Thus, experiential 
practice followed by post-task discussion may provide the 
inductive base necessary to counter wayward theory 
(Brehmer, 1980; Mathews et al., 1989).
This prescription for combating reflective abstraction 
error is consistent with descriptions of the developmental 
process which one must follow to advance in many skills.
For example, first language acquisition is certainly a case 
where substantial experience precedes the acquisition of 
valid reflective knowledge. The difficulties faced by 
adults when learning a second language may occur in part 
because they already have a language model (i.e., grammar) 
and the cognitive capacity to reflect on that model as they 
experience the new language (e.g., Johnson & Newport,
1989). Certainly adults have much more sophisticated 
theories about grammars than do children. Possibly, 
children with their more limited cognitive capacity are 
less able to reflect on the input.
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In a similar vein. Bloom’s (1985) discussion of 
exceptional performers in skills ranging from music to 
athletics suggests that the childhood experiences of all 
exceptional performers are characterized by play and 
exploration in their chosen skill for no other reason than 
their own enjoyment. Formal structured study typically 
comes much later in their development.
The importance of the theories learners bring, or don't 
bring, to any learning situation is most strongly apparent 
in the literature on misconceptions, or alternative 
conceptions (Wandersee et al., 1994), in science education. 
The difficulty students have in learning subjects such as 
simple mechanics (e.g., Caramazza, McCloskey, & Green,
1980; diSessa, 1982; McDermott, 1984), electricity (e.g., 
Cohen, Eylon, & Ganiel, 1983; Heller, 1987), or the nature 
of matter (e.g., Novick & Nussbaum, 1978; Wandersee, 1983), 
has been found to be related to the conceptions they bring 
to the classroom and how those conceptions interact with 
the scientific concepts to be learned (Osborne, Bell, & 
Gilbert, 1983). The theories students bring to the 
classroom can lead to suboptimal learning outcomes.
One's natural response to the difficulties of these 
students is to challenge their concepts directly. However, 
the results of this investigation suggest that directly 
engaging people's reflective knowledge can lead to 
reflective abstraction error, unless their reflection is
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directed toward discussion of experiential knowledge, or it 
is guided by an external source that can reinforce correct 
choice and application of reflective rules.
Future Directions for Research
The strong negative intact of reflective practice 
reported in these experiments requires replication. This 
is particularly important considering the contrast between 
the current findings and those of Mathews et al. (1996) in 
which reflective practice, combined with group discussion, 
led to superior performance. A logical follow-up would 
compare the two methods within a single experiment. An 
importcuit variable to investigate in such a replication 
would be the type of feedback learners receive about their 
reflective knowledge (i.e., their written policies).
A possible limitation of this study is the reliance on 
the sugar production task. One could argue that Reflective 
Abstraction Error is limited to situations where there is 
an incongruence between the cover story describing the 
system (sugar production) and the actual behavior of the 
system. This limitation could be addressed in a couple of 
ways.
One way to address this limitation would be to 
investigate the effect of different cover stories (e.g., 
the 'person control task", Stanley et al, 1989) varying in 
their degree of congruence with task behavior. Possibly,
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Reflection Abstraction Error would be systematically 
related to this variable.
Another possibility would be to select less artificial 
tasks. Two such examples are the city transportation task 
of Broadbent et al. (1986) and the simulated economic 
system used by Broadbent and Aston (1978). Finding 
Reflective Abstraction Error in tasks such as these would 
support the generalization of these findings beyond the 
laboratory.
The strong negative effects of reflective practice
reported in this investigation might challenge one's faith
in thoughtful reflection. However, we should find comfort
in Schumacher's observation that more experiential ways of
knowing can guide us in our journey.
Yet a man who uses an imaginary map, thinking that it 
is a true one, is likely to be worse off than someone 
with no map at all; for he will fail to inquire 
whenever he can, to observe every detail on his way, 
and to search continuously with all his senses and all 
his intelligence for indications of where he should go. 
(E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful)
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APPENDIX A 
COMPUTER SIMULATION PROCEDURES 
The primary purpose of the simulation program was to 
eliminate the subjectivity involved in selecting from a 
policy the most appropriate rule to apply on each trial.
To that end, each policy was translated into a set of if- 
then rules (e.g., "if production is above target then use 
fewer workers") . The rules were submitted to a computer 
program that performed the same 40-trial test as performed 
by experimental participants.
Translation of Policies into Rules 
Every attempt was made to translate every statement 
contained in each policy into a rule for selecting 
workforce size. Each rule was of the form: if <conditions> 
then <action>. Conditions could be auiy proposition about 
the state of the sugar production system. Conditions could 
refer to prior states (e.g., "if 400 workers were used on 
the previous two trials and production increased then..."). 
However, conditions were not allowed which referred to 
states that occurred in a prior block of ten trials.
Because participants often stated rules with no condition 
(e.g., "use 600 workers"), empty conditions were allowed. 
For example, the rule above would be translated as "if <> 
then use 600 workers".
The actions of rules were allowed to be single values 
(e.g., use 350 workers") or lists or ranges of values.
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This was necessary because policy statements often referred 
to workforce sizes in relative (e.g., "more") or abstract 
(e.g., "low") terms. When translating statements into 
rules, these cases were handled in the following way: (a)
"more, or less, workers than X" was interpreted as a 
randomly selected value of workers between X and the 
maximum or minimum number of workers allowed, respectively; 
(b) "a high, or low, number of workers" was taken to mean 
a randomly selected number of workers above 750 or below 
450 respectively; and (c) "an increasing, or decreasing, 
number of workers" was interpreted the same as in (a) .
On occasion, participants would include mathematical 
formulas into the condition of a rule. Whenever possible, 
these formulas were translated into procedures that would 
check the state of the sugar production system to determine 
if the condition was satisfied. Similarly, the actions of 
rules sometimes were in the form of formulas (e.g., "if 
<action> then <take current production level and divide by 
10 to get worker level>"). In this case, the action was 
translated into procedure that would output a list of one 
or more values for workforce size.
Simulation Procedure
The same 40-trial test performed by all participants 
was used as the simulation task. On each trial of the 
simulated task, all rules whose conditions are satisfied 
are first identified. Each rule then casts one vote for
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each possible workforce size implicated by its action. For 
example, if the rule "if <production is low> then <use more 
than 600 workers>" had its condition satisfied, then it 
would cast one vote each for 650, 700, 750, 800,...1200 
workers. The actual number of workers chosen on that trial 
is simply the number of workers receiving the most votes.
On trials where no rules applied (their conditions were 
not satisfied), the workforce size from the previous trial 
was repeated. When no rule applied on the first trial of a 
block, a random value was chosen for workforce size.
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APPENDIX B
REPEATED-MEASURES ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENT 1
Source df SS MS F
Between subjects
Mode 1 1502.1 1502.1 10.90*
Exposure 2 4036.8 2.0 0.01
Mode X Exposure 2 402.8 201.4 1.46
Error(between) 109 15022.2 137.8
Within subjects
Session 2 3112.4 1556.2 37.44*
Session X Mode 2 746.1 373.0 8.98*
Session X Exposure 4 91.9 23.0 0.55
Session X Mode X Exposure 4 275.3 68.8 1.66
Error(within) 218 9060.5 41.6
'̂ p<.05.
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APPENDIX C
ANALYSIS OF FINAL TEST PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENT 1
Source df SS MS F
Mode 1 1411.1 1411.1 16.05*
Exposure 2 33.1 16.5 0.19
Mode X Exposure 2 562.4 281.2 3.20*
Error 109 9580.4 87.9
*p<.05.
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APPENDIX D
ANALYSIS OF FINAL POLICY QUALITY IN EXPERIMENT 1
Source df SS MS F
Mode 1 1067.4 1067.4 10.06*
Exposure 2 340.7 170.4 1.61
Mode X Exposure 2 1223.3 611.6 5.76*
Error 109 11569.9 106.1
^p<. 05,
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APPENDIX E
ANALYSIS OF CONTROL GROUPS IN EXPERIMENT 1
Source df SS MS F
Treatment 2 1269.1 634.6 6.04*
Error 57 5984.9 105.0
Note. Treatment groups contained in this analysis were: 
practice-only, predict-only, and no exposure/ experiential
*p<.05.
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APPENDIX F
REPEATED-MEASURES ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENT 2
Source df SS MS I
Between subjects
Treatment 2 3248.8 1624.4 8.91*
Error(between) 49 8928.9 182.2
Within subjects
Session 2 7575.7 3787.8 93.34*
Session X Treatment 4 1364.7 341.2 8.41*
Error(within) 98 3977.1 40.6
^p<.05.
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APPENDIX G
ANALYSIS OF FINAL TEST PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENT 2
Source df SS MS F
Treatment 2 2019.3 1009.6 11.42*
Error 49 4331.7 88.4
*p<.05.
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APPENDIX H
ANALYSIS OF FINAL POLICY QUALITY IN EXPERIMENT 2
Source df SS MS F
Treatment 2 3022.6 1511.3 10.37*
Error 49 7143.0 145.8
*p<.05.
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APPENDIX I
REPEATED-MEASURES ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENT 3
Source df SS MS
Between subjects
Mode 1 34.4 34.4 0.25
Hint 2 1993.9 996.9 7.13*
Mode X Hint 2 113.9 56.9 0.41
Error(between) 115 16087.6 139.9
Within subjects
Session 2 4820.9 2410.5 60.92*
Session X Mode 2 64.4 32.2 0.81
Session X Hint 4 907.7 226.9 5.73*
Session X Mode X Hint 4 119.2 29.8 0.75
Error(within) 230 9101.3 39.6
^p<. 05.
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APPENDIX J
ANALYSIS OF FINAL TEST PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENT 3
Source df SS MS I
Mode 1 3.5 3.5 0.06
Hint 2 769.8 384.9 6.62*
Mode X Hint 2 6.9 3.5 0.06
Error 115 6685.2 58.1
*p<.05.
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APPENDIX K
ANALYSIS OF FINAL POLICY QUALITY IN EXPERIMENT 3
Source df SS MS F
Mode 1 34.3 34.3 0.22
Hint 2 85.5 42.7 0.27
Mode X Hint 2 259.0 129.5 0.82
Error 115 18101.3 157.4
*p<.05.
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